Reasons and Resentment

In this dissertation I develop a theory of practical reasons as such, and then I extend that theory to specifically moral reasons. According to the theory of practical reasons that I develop in Part I, the existence and weight of an agent's reason to act in a particular way depends on an agent's motivational states--specifically those motivational states issuing from practical orientations that play some role in structuring the agent's practical identity. I then argue that this account of practical reasons is a well-motivated reductive account of practical reasons that is extensionally adequate. In Part II, I turn to questions of specifically moral reasons, which putatively have the properties of being categorical and of having practical priority. I argue that the theory of practical reasons that I develop in Part I doesn't rule out the possibility that moral reasons would have these two properties, and I suggest (following Peter Strawson) that such properties could be grounded in our orientation towards others as participants in certain forms of meaningful interpersonal relationships--an orientation that is perhaps internal to our practical identity as relational agents. I argue that if this is correct, then moral reasons will be categorical and have practical priority