Confounded but not converted: A balanced interpretation of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion

Thesis (M.A.) California State University, Los Angeles, 2012Committee members: Taila M Bettcher, Joseph Prabhu, Michael Shim, Kayley VernallisDesign argument, Natural belief, SkepticismI present an interpretation of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion which clearly shows that Philo is a consistent religious skeptic who rejects the hypothesis of design throughout. However, Philo really is confounded by Cleanthes' irregular inference of design, and finds himself drawn to it despite his skeptical principles. This is not because he accepts design as something akin to a natural belief, but simply reflects the lack of anything resembling an acceptable naturalistic alternative. Philo's skeptical credentials are fully reaffirmed by his assertion of a direct counterbalance to the intuition of design: apparent design in nature may be odious and replete with evils rather than admirable; this perspective leaves the impression of a blind and inexplicable nature, and underwrites the skeptical suspense of judgment regarding theism. Finally, I show in detail that Philo's apparent concessions to design in Part XII are entirely ironic, and so he remains a religious skeptic