The paper analyzes the strategic behavior of several countries engaged in capital accumulation, pollution mitigation, and environmental adaptation in the context of an environmental common good. Both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies are discussed. The non-cooperative strategy is a dynamic game in which each country makes its own environmental decision following the open-loop Nash equilibrium. The cooperative social planner problem assumes an international environmental agreement in force. The non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are compared in the symmetric case of two countries and extended to several identical countries. It is shown that the non-cooperative strategy in multi-country world leads to over-production, over-con...
This article deals with cooperation issues in international pollution problems in a two dimensional ...
Thispaper examines the performance of non-cooperative environmentalpolicy in the case of local consu...
This paper surveys theories of international environmental agreements. Central to the analysis is th...
The paper analyzes the strategic behavior of several countriesengaged in capital accumulation, pollu...
Pollution mitigation and environmental adaptation are essential components of long-term environmenta...
In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each countr...
This paper provides a general framework for studying the profitability and stability of internationa...
In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each countr...
The present paper proposes a dynamic framework for the analysis of emissions abatement by different ...
This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. ...
We formulate and study a nonlinear game of n symmetric countries that produce, pollute, and spend pa...
This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. ...
The main objective of this research is to find the possible stable coalitions between developed coun...
The purpose of this master thesis is to use game theory to analyse global warming in a world consist...
The regulation of environmental externalities at the global level requires international agreements ...
This article deals with cooperation issues in international pollution problems in a two dimensional ...
Thispaper examines the performance of non-cooperative environmentalpolicy in the case of local consu...
This paper surveys theories of international environmental agreements. Central to the analysis is th...
The paper analyzes the strategic behavior of several countriesengaged in capital accumulation, pollu...
Pollution mitigation and environmental adaptation are essential components of long-term environmenta...
In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each countr...
This paper provides a general framework for studying the profitability and stability of internationa...
In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each countr...
The present paper proposes a dynamic framework for the analysis of emissions abatement by different ...
This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. ...
We formulate and study a nonlinear game of n symmetric countries that produce, pollute, and spend pa...
This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. ...
The main objective of this research is to find the possible stable coalitions between developed coun...
The purpose of this master thesis is to use game theory to analyse global warming in a world consist...
The regulation of environmental externalities at the global level requires international agreements ...
This article deals with cooperation issues in international pollution problems in a two dimensional ...
Thispaper examines the performance of non-cooperative environmentalpolicy in the case of local consu...
This paper surveys theories of international environmental agreements. Central to the analysis is th...