The Notion of Desire in Lévinas’ Philosophy

Članak se bavi pojmom želje u Levinasovoj filozofiji, sa posebnim osvrtom na pitanje njenog metafizičkog karaktera. Oslanjajući se i na rane radove Levinasa, autor pokušava da dekonstruiše pojam želje ukazujući na njegov protivrečni odnos prema konceptu potreba. Posebna pažnja je posvećena nekim drugim fenomenološkim interpretacijama (Huserl, Hajdeger, Sartr, Mišel Anri) i dijalektičkom shvatanju želje (Hegel), a to omogućava da se zahvati specifičnost Levinasove perspektive. Na kraju članka autor se bavi mogućnošću etike koja bi polazila od responzivne želje, u okviru fenomenologije alteriteta.This paper deals with the notion of desire in Lévinas’ philosophy, with special attention to the question of its metaphysical character. By relying upon the early works of Lévinas as well, the author deconstructs the notion of desire by pointing at its contradictory relationship to the concept of needs. Attention is devoted to certain phenomenological interpretations (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Michel Henry) and to the dialectical understanding of desire (Hegel) that enables us to seize the specificity of Lévinas’ viewpoint. At the end of the paper the author discusses the possibility of an ethics of responsive desire within the phenomenology of alterity