Space, Place and Things. Heidegger on non-existential Spatiality

Tema ovog rada je ispitivanje Hajdegerovog razumevanja prostora, u razmaku od njegove rane do pozne filozofije. Pitanje prostora razmo-trićemo na primeru stvari, odnosno bivstvujućih različitih od čoveka, kako u kontekstu fundamentalne ontologije, gde primat ima prostor-nost tubivstvovanja, tako i u okvirima pozne misli, gde se mišljenje prostora oslobađa tog primata tubivstvovanja. U radu ćemo analizi-rati Hajdegerove stavove iz Bivstvovanja i vremena, kao i one iz pre-davanja Umetnost i prostor. Ključna nit-vodilja analize biće Hajdege-rova kritika tradiranih koncepcija prostora, kao i naglašena inverzija odnosa mesta i prostora. Analizom navedenih tekstova pokazaćemo da je pitanje neegzistencijalne prostornosti bitno obeležilo Hajdege-rov otklon od pozicija fundamentalne ontologije, ali i da je njegova obrada u tim okvirima naznačila osnovne crte dalje razrade razume-vanja bivstvovanja bivstvujućih drugačijih od čoveka. Zaključno, pita-nje neegzistencijalne prostornosti, smatramo, pokazuje se kao poli-gon razumevanja takozvanog kategorijalnog načina bivstvovanja, naročito u poznoj Hajdegerovoj misli.The topic of this paper are Heidegger’s conceptions of space and place, with regard to spatiality of a thing, that is, of beings which are different from Dasein. My aim is to show that Heidegger’s understanding of these beings is more important for both his early and later philosophy than it is usually presented in interpretations. Since Heide-gger goes against traditional philosophy, and claims that traditional metaphysics was forged according to the model of non-existential beings (things), his own project is largely overshadowed by the primacy of Dasein and the question of being as such. Accordingly, the issue of being of non-existential, that is, categorial beings is often seen only in view of these other two prominent problems. In this paper I will try to challenge such positions by analyzing the relationship between space and being of non-existential beings, that is, their non-existential spatiality. I will try to show that such non-existential spatiality is at the core of Heidegger’s reflections on existential spatiality of Dasein in Being and Time, and that most of his ideas about non-existen-tial spatiality survive his turn away from fundamental ontology towards his later phi-losophy. To prove this point, I will compare Heidegger’s positions on place and sculp-ture from his later work The Art and Space with his ideas about place and space from Being and Time. Although situated against different background ideas, both of these works share at least two important points regarding the problem of space, namely, Heidegger’s critique of scientific and traditional philosophical conceptions of space, and the inversion of the relationship between space and place, in favour of place. Re-lying on these two points, I will try to point out to the specific changes between these two works regarding the issue of space. Finally, Heidegger’s later works, avoid-ing the early primacy of existential spatiality, clearly shows that the issue of space is directly related to the question of being of non-existential beings. Such perspective, in my view, allows for the reexamining of Heidegger’s philosophical strategy in both his later and early philosophy