International audienceWe study a notion of locally robust implementation that captures the idea that the planner may know agentsʼ beliefs well, but not perfectly. Locally robust implementation is a weaker concept than ex-post implementation, but we show that no regular allocation function is locally robust implementable in generic settings with quasi-linear utility, interdependent and bilinear values, and multi-dimensional payoff types
We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness condition is necessary for a form of robust approximate im...
In situations in which the social planner has to make several decisions over time, before agents hav...
We consider the generic robustness of an upper hemi-continuous solution concept on a class of games ...
International audienceWe study a notion of locally robust implementation that captures the idea that...
We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular...
Following the notion of continuous implementation, we consider a situation where the social planner ...
We consider robust virtual implementation, where robustness is the requirement that implementation s...
We introduce an equivalent definition for robust implementation, termed s-rationalizable implementat...
Weakly rationalizable implementation represents a generalization of robust implemen-tation to dynami...
This paper discusses some connections among several robustness concepts of mechanisms in terms of ag...
This paper investigates the extent to which rationalizable implementation depends on the implicit co...
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves o...
We examine a strong form of robust implementation in dynamic mechanisms that is both belief- and bel...
We study robust mechanism design in environments in which agents commonly believe that others’ types...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] In a ...
We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness condition is necessary for a form of robust approximate im...
In situations in which the social planner has to make several decisions over time, before agents hav...
We consider the generic robustness of an upper hemi-continuous solution concept on a class of games ...
International audienceWe study a notion of locally robust implementation that captures the idea that...
We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular...
Following the notion of continuous implementation, we consider a situation where the social planner ...
We consider robust virtual implementation, where robustness is the requirement that implementation s...
We introduce an equivalent definition for robust implementation, termed s-rationalizable implementat...
Weakly rationalizable implementation represents a generalization of robust implemen-tation to dynami...
This paper discusses some connections among several robustness concepts of mechanisms in terms of ag...
This paper investigates the extent to which rationalizable implementation depends on the implicit co...
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves o...
We examine a strong form of robust implementation in dynamic mechanisms that is both belief- and bel...
We study robust mechanism design in environments in which agents commonly believe that others’ types...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] In a ...
We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness condition is necessary for a form of robust approximate im...
In situations in which the social planner has to make several decisions over time, before agents hav...
We consider the generic robustness of an upper hemi-continuous solution concept on a class of games ...