The cognitive processes underlying impression change

Two experiments explored the causes and consequences of impression change. Subjects changed their impressions when they preferred an expectancy-inconsistent explanation for an expectancy-deviant event but not when they preferred an expectancy-consistent explanation for it. Subjects had better recall of behaviors that were consistent with their impression when either no explanation or an expectancy-consistent explanation was provided for the event. When an expectancy-inconsistent explanation was provided, subjects recalled behaviors that were inconsistent with their impression better. However, there was no relation between subjects' judgments and their recall of the target's behaviors. Subjects' judgments and recall were not influenced by the presence or absence of a specific expectation for the target, but rather, were determined by normative expectations for people's behavior. Finally, impression change did not lead to the formation of a separate representation of the target. The implications of these results for models of person memory are discussed.U of I OnlyETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permissio