Add to ORKGThe temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or contiguous relations between independently definable mental events, as proposed by Locke and Parfit. The identity of the self over time is normative: it depends on the institutional context of social rules external to the self that determine the relationship between past commitments and current responsibilities. (2005
Abstract In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpre-tation of the...
In this paper, I argue that standard psychological continuity theory does not account for an importa...
In this paper, I argue that standard psychological continuity theory does not account for an importa...
The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or cont...
The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or cont...
The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or cont...
The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or cont...
The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or cont...
The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or cont...
Persons enjoy identity over time. But persons do not have temporal parts. They are not four-dimensio...
According to the psychological account of personal identity for someone to be one and the same perso...
In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This partic...
In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This partic...
In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This partic...
This honors thesis examines the question of numerical personal identity through time. What are the n...
Abstract In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpre-tation of the...
In this paper, I argue that standard psychological continuity theory does not account for an importa...
In this paper, I argue that standard psychological continuity theory does not account for an importa...
The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or cont...
The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or cont...
The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or cont...
The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or cont...
The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or cont...
The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or cont...
Persons enjoy identity over time. But persons do not have temporal parts. They are not four-dimensio...
According to the psychological account of personal identity for someone to be one and the same perso...
In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This partic...
In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This partic...
In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This partic...
This honors thesis examines the question of numerical personal identity through time. What are the n...
Abstract In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpre-tation of the...
In this paper, I argue that standard psychological continuity theory does not account for an importa...
In this paper, I argue that standard psychological continuity theory does not account for an importa...