Identity construction and media text: representation of Belgrade's urban transformations in music videos

IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND MEDIA TEXT: Representation of Belgrade’s urban transformations in music videos SUMMARY i Opening remarks Focusing on the way in which Belgrade featured in music videos of various genres (produced from 1980 to 2010) I have tried to open up a fresh perspective on its urban and social transformations. The beginning of this period saw Belgrade as the capital of a socialist multi-national federation; its final years saw the city as the capital and cultural centre of a (mono)national state with underdeveloped capitalist economy (along with the ‘war consequences’ and social price to be paid for this transformation.) Using a production sample of 4733 music videos, I have explored the ‘language’ of representation of Belgrade’s cityscape in this media form as one possible clue to understanding the processes of identity (re)construction, narratives of belonging and cultural divisions in the Serbian society. As this study argues, observed in the context of popular media industry, these narratives are unjustifiably absent from academic considerations, which makes them a fruitful field for future research of cultural developments in the post-socialist Balkans. ii Methodological considerations discuss the existing academic sources (or lack thereof in the Serbian context), analytical tools for this study, and methodological difficulties in approaching music videos as complex semiotic systems. iii What’s all this for? attempts to provide a precise answer to the question I PINK CHAPTER: Belgrade as the melting pot of cultural models Introduction: Musical taste as capital and weapon discusses the bourdieuean assumptions of musical taste as both a form of symbolic capital and weapon in the ‘low-intensity’ culture wars, where musical affinities may provide (arbitrary) pretexts for social divisions and symbolic violence. According toHerbert Gans, the critique of mass culture is often biased, self-serving and oriented to the interests of high culture alone and to the maximization of its power and resources. High culture advocates are entitled (as anyone else) to be self-serving, but they have no right to mask their interests as public and suggest that society as a whole ought to be organized around the efforts to advance ‘the fortunes of high culture’. Such observations become all the more revealing when transposed into societies (e.g. Serbian) which lack a firm consensus on ‘legitimate culture’, and wherein various forms of ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture often swap their roles and prerogatives. i Cultural models of the socialist self-management system Focus of the ‘pink’ chapter is the dynamics of transformation of cultural models in the Serbian society, wherein the ‘newly-composed folk music’ (novokomponovana narodna muzika, later turbo-folk) claimed a specific role and importance – as a ‘symptom’ of sharpest social divisions and most visible paradoxes. Sociological studies of ‘life styles’ in the Yugoslav socialist society generally assumed that the main social strata markedly differentiated according to the interests, classconsciousness and value orientations of the population. The initial post-socialist period of ‘transition’ (1990s) saw the apparent ‘melting’ of this structure (and thus conceptualized stratification) of the Serbian society into a new hierarchy of cultural models wherein the populist (‘newly-composed’) claimed increasing importance. Contrary to the scholarship from the socialist period (which persistently kept this cultural model at the fringes of academic concerns), it was ultimately recognized as ‘highly influential and probably the most widespread cultural model in the post-war Yugoslavia’. (The term ‘newlycomposed’ comes from the significance attached to consumption of ‘newly-composed folk music’.) ii ‘Newly-composed’ cultural model However disputed by the socialist officials and banned from the educational system, this cultural model was well integrated in the Yugoslav cultural and mass media systems (television, radio, record industry, concert venues…) The key to its mass popularity was seen in the successful blending of the traditional (folkloric) and new urban myths. The ‘newly-composed’ folk singers were held in highest esteem, but this was generally assumed to be the case exclusively among the rural population. However, although scarce, research of the urban audiences often contradicted this assumption. iii ‘Newly-composed folk music’ and cultural politics Since the end of the World War II the official cultural politics of the socialist Yugoslavia went through different (often contradictory) phases in its approach to the folkloric traditions of Yugoslav ‘nations and nationalities’, and to the village and ‘rural ways’ in general. This ultimately shaped the perception of the ‘original’ traditional (izvorna) and the ‘newly-composed’ (novokomponovana) folk music as opposite poles in assessment of the legacies of traditional rural cultures and their ‘second life’ in the modern society. Release of Lepa Lukić’s single Od izvora dva putića (1964) marked a symbolical beginning of the new era of commercial expansion of the ‘newly composed folk music’ (NCFM). Reforms associated with introduction of workers’ self-management into the Yugoslav economy also resulted in ‘democratization’ of the popular music production: the newly-established elements of market economy turned the attention of record companies towards commercially successful performers, and those were mainly the singers of NCFM. Their output was a powerful economic factor which connected record companies from different ends of Yugoslavia and shaped its music industry. Nevertheless, the concept of ‘culture’ in a socialist society stood for accessibility, humanist principles and, above all, artistic values. The ideology of progress imposed upon the ‘evolving’ revolutionary peasantry a need of modern cultural institutions. It was expected not only to depart from its ‘traditional ways’ and embrace modern(ized) and urban(ized) modes of cultural consumption, but also to develop appreciation for art. In this aspect of cultural consumption the ‘centaurs of Yugoslav economy’ (peasantsindustrial workers) most visibly failed to meet the guidelines of the socialist cultural policies. The overwhelming presence and importance of NCFM (both in rural and urban areas) became the most visible symptom of this cultural ‘underachievement’. In Yugoslavia, NCFM had a ‘past’, but not a ‘history’, of which it was perceived as ‘undeserving’. This attitude reflects a culturally specific perception of history as an exclusive domain of ‘cultural value’. The observers of the phenomenon typically ‘distanced themselves’ from the core audiences of NCFM, adopting the position of ‘outsiders’ with no active participation in its consumption. Those ‘in charge’ (including the Adornian critics of mass culture) labeled this music as a caricature of mass culture and ultimate instance of surrogate for an authentic culture (opposed, as such, to the idealized notion of ‘pure, original folk songs’). The end product was perceived as ‘fake folklore’– or, rather, ‘fakelore’– and normally tagged as kitsch or schund. This assessment brought about anti-schund legal acts, special tax rates for the products of NCFM industry and occasional campaigns aimed at ‘decontamination’ of cultural life in the country from pulp and distasteful music forms. These lofty efforts included occasional commissions of ‘new folk songs’ from respectable professional composers. Composers of NCFM were denied membership in official professional associations, but that ‘discrimination’ had no considerable effects on their income. Affluence of ‘folk stars’ was the most visible deviation from the official doctrines and work ethos of the socialist society. As such, folk celebrities were always eagerly criticized ‘in public’. Furthermore, commercialization of the Yugoslav music industry was in head-on clash with the major goal of the official cultural policies – ‘historical process of abolishing market culture’ – serving as a constant reminder of their discrepancies. iv Belgrade – capital of NCFM Social and economic systems of the socialist Yugoslavia encouraged mass migration from villages into towns and cities, and rapid development of urban centers. Belgrade, its capital, found itself in the apex of these migratory processes. This rapid urbanization was seen as bringing about ‘social and cultural continuity between the village and the city’. Musical taste of the urban population (commercial success of folk music in all social categories, especially among Belgraders) was found to be the most conspicuous manifestation of this continuity. v Genesis of the genre In this subchapter we look at the main thematic concerns of the ‘newly-composed’ folk songs, historical development of this music genre and its most prominent figures, and discuss the relations between traditional and modern elements which contributed to its popularity. vi From ‘turban folk’ to ‘turbo folk’ During the 1980s, the Serbian-Bosnian music production Južni vetar (Southern Wind) established a particular mode of ‘orientalization’ of Yugoslav folk music idioms. Routinely attacked by the cultural ‘gatekeepers’ and advocates of ‘authenticity’ in folk music as the most striking exponents of ‘oriental kitsch’ – the stars of Južni vetar nevertheless enjoyed enormous popularity and a firm fan base. The last days of socialist Yugoslavia (along with the collapse of its institutions) saw the ‘oriental’ aspect of this music identified with ‘otherness’– a cultural threat for various ‘threads’ of the Yugoslav ‘ethnic carpet’. Gastarbeiters (low-income Yugoslav workforce ‘imported’ by wealthy Western countries) were considered to be the main ‘conduit’ of incorporation of Oriental music influence into the Yugoslav ‘newly-composed’ folk music. Though ostensibly a specifically Yugoslav phenomenon, this ‘oriental controversy’ had parallels in other countries of the Balkans and Middle East e.g. Bulgaria, Turkey or Israel. With the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia and armed conflicts throughout its former territory, the already well-elaborated discourse of ‘newly-composed contamination’ assumed a new political context. In Serbia, attempts at ‘de-orientalization’ of Serbian folk music obtained firm political ground. In the changing social circumstances NCFM also acquired a new name – turbo folk. As a hybrid music genre and media phenomenon the ‘oriental’ turbo folk was panned from all sides: by academics, politicians, media professionals, rock musicians, pop stars and folk singers. In the Serbian context, contemporary forms of ‘contaminated’ (over-exposed to foreign influence) folk music thus came to be seen as ‘ideological shorthand’ in public debates on ‘legitimate’ aspects of national culture. vii General notes on turbo folk In Serbia, gradual incorporation of elements ‘borrowed’ from contemporary genres of Western popular music into the existing forms of NCFM resulted in ‘turbo folk’ marked by its escapist and commercial concerns, and liberal exchange with other countries of the Balkans and Middle East. At this point we discuss the characteristics it shares with other genres of popular music throughout the (Third) world, its hypothetical origins and main phases of development in Belgrade, production infrastructure that built up its media prominence, and its key exponents. We also focus on the styles and outlooks of the most assertive urban consumers of turbo folk in the 1990s (dizelaši). viii Turbo folk as a social issue Due to its heavy media exposure in the 1990s turbo folk was seen by many as ‘camouflage’ for the harsh social reality in Serbia (UN sanctions, armed conflicts with the neighboring countries of former Yugoslavia, economic downfall) with the ‘pink’ imagery of compulsive entertainment. As the ‘soundtrack’ of the regime of Slobodan Milošević it was seen as music for gangsters and all those who made a fortune (backed by the authorities) through their ‘efforts’ at the war front. This music (and bad taste associated with it) was seen as a generator of violence and chauvinism imposing the patriarchal order and other aspects of Serbia’s cultural and moral demise. Even the international admirers of turbo folk saw in it ‘an intimate relationship between music and terrorism’. Cultural officials of Milošević’s regime (naturally) became aware of the bad reputation associated with patronage of turbo folk. However, complaints from the opposite side of the political spectrum did not differ considerably from the rhetoric of the Ministry of Culture. This brought about an observation that in public debates ‘turbo folk’ normally stands for more than a genre of music or entertainment: right-wing critics typically claim that TF corrupts the Serbian national identity instead of boosting it in times of crisis, while the left-wing blames TF for boosting Serbian nationalism when it rather should be suppressed. In the regional (post-Yugoslav) context, turbo folk operates as a ‘conceptual category which aggregates connotations of banality, foreigness, violence and kitsch in order to provide a critical apparatus with a ready-made strategy of distancing’ – a variant of ‘nesting orientalism’. Each cultural barricade raised against TF is seen as a measure against a ‘threat’ from the East. On the other hand, during the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, popularity of the same celebrities on both sides of the frontline disproved the chauvinist premises attached to turbo folk. In spite of all the slander, turbo folk effectively crossed ethnic barriers. Accordingly, it came to be seen as a rare instance of (conscious or not) re-interpretation of the old ‘Ottoman Commonwealth style’ cosmopolitanism. Thus ‘critics of the critics’ regard turbo folk as the ‘only authentic Serbian pop music’, utterly misperceived as a product of Milošević’s criminal regime. Moreover, ‘the turbo folk issue’, its understanding and valuation illuminate Serbia’s key political problem: incapacity of the liberal elites to communicate with the major segment of the population they aspire to lead. ix Belgrade – capital of turbo folk Architectural Encyclopedia of Belgrade detects the presence of turbo-architecture, style defined as a ‘malignant variety of postmodernism’. Glamorous villas of the nouveau riche (graced with arbitrarily combined elements of remote origins in ancient Rome and Ottoman Anatolia) are seen as striking manifestations of both the arrogance and self perception of the political, war profiteering and show business ‘elites’. Those ‘fairytale castles’ have also been described as ‘arias of the Serbian architectural soap opera’. The uncultured world of turbo folk is over-populated by young women in super-mini skirts who live in super-big houses, drive super-expensive cars, and spend their time in fancy hotel bars. According to the close observers of the phenomenon, this turbo-folk glitterserves an additional ideological purpose: rendered in glamorous and romantic hues, lifestyles of the new criminalized elites become normal, acceptable i.e. legitimate. x Turbo folk in the post-Milošević period First years of the new millennium in Serbia were marked by the difficult political, economic and social ‘legacy’ of the Milošević period, which obstructed the processes of institutional transformation of the society and change of its dominant values. The tabloids did replace the exponents of the ‘old regime’ with new personalities, but their content still prominently features turbo folk celebrities. Mass culture continues to be used as an instrument of pacifying the increasingly frustrated and aggressive ‘masses’. As a result, Serbian culture (and the overall society) is still overwhelmingly populist. On the other hand, criticism of turbo folk remains a standard element of the ‘discourse of power’, at all levels. Thus turbo folk appears to be ‘the only victim’ of the ‘democratic revolution’, made to obscure the effective ideological and pragmatic continuity between the pre- and post-2000 governments. Nevertheless, media appearances of turbo folk stars who occasionally make ‘unexpected’ liberal, gay-friendly or anti-nationalist statements support the observation that turbo folk claims a specific, ambivalent position in the contemporary Serbian culture: it is at the same time its dominant mainstream and ‘hidden subversion’, graced even with ‘radical potential’. Moreover, turbo folk’s ‘trans-national’ sampling of the contemporary and ethnic music of often conflicting Balkan ‘tribes’ is acknowledged for its beneficial and pacifying effects. Through these lenses turbo folk is observed as a vehicle of ‘reconciliation and tolerance’ in the Balkans. xi Cultural models of the transition era Researchers of cultural models propose a new typology, prevalent in the Serbian society after the year 2000: a) urban-ethnic b) urban-globalist c) sensationalist d) rural-spectacular which can be observed as a ‘successor’ to the populist (‘newly-composed’) cultural model (fused with the agro-cultural model and certain elements of drug users’ and delinquents’ subcultures present in the previously discussed typologies of the socialist period). This typology shows that only c) sensationalist cultural model is not laid out along the axis ‘urban-rural’. New research in cultural sociology distinguishes four symbolical ‘battlefields’ in Serbia: 1) the educated against the uneducated; 2) urban groups against the rural and recently ‘urbanized’; 3) ‘cultured’ North against ‘uncultured’ South; 4) ‘cosmopolitans’ vs. ‘patriots’ – arguing that all these cultural opposites have clear political consequences. Contrary to the processes in the French society discussed by Pierre Bourdieu, the major ‘clash’ of lifestyles does not take place between the proponents of elite and popular culture, and high culture does not claim the status of ‘legitimate’ culture a priori. In Serbia, the main ‘frontline’ is the axis global-local, differentiating between two respective types of cultural capital. Their holders struggle to promote their cultural resources as legitimate. In that sense, the opening quote for the ‘pink’ chapter from the turbo folk star Mira Škorić (‘Turbo folk rules!’) may be read as a claim to legitimacy of an ambivalent and contested, yet overwhelming cultural paradigm in the Serbian society. BELGRADE IN THE SHADES OF PINK maps the dominant modes of representation of Belgrade’s cityscape in music videos of the neo folk (NCFM and turbo folk) genre, and their transformations in the period 1980-2010 II BLACK CHAPTER: Belgrade as the ‘city of resistance’ i Divide and Conquer: beginnings of rock’n’roll in Belgrade After the difficult years of post-WWII reconstruction of the country, rock’n’roll ‘invaded’ Belgrade almost instantly. Rock culture was perceived as the first opportunity for the young generations to express themselves in ‘authentic’ and truly ‘own’ manners. In socialist Yugoslavia, from the beginnings in the late 1950s, a place in this culture implied ‘social distinction’, but also a position in the underlying conflict between the ‘cool’ (self-aware ‘cosmopolitans’) and the ‘uncool’ (politically conformist ‘provincials’). ii Who could resist not to resist?: rock’n’roll in the arsenal of the Cold War Back in 1958 NATO Revue militaire générale already explained how jazz and rock’n’roll might be used in the war against communism: the more time teenagers in communist countries dedicate to Little Richard, the less time they have to read Marx and Lenin. In the case of socialist Yugoslavia, according to Time magazine ‘Half Karl & Half Groucho Marx country’, such estimations turned out to be true. Throughout Eastern Europe, incorporation of jazz and rock in the official media systems served two main ideological purposes: control over the segment of the younger population openly (or not) opposed to the ‘socialist reality’, and demonstration (to the West) of the merits of socialist democracy. In the East, ‘high tolerance’ for rock’n’roll was typically criticized as blind glorification of the American Dream, out of place in the socialist societies. In the West, rockers from the East were often perceived as ‘rebels with a cause’, evidence that younger generations behind the Curtain ‘reclaim’ the Western values. In Yugoslavia, youth Party cadre soon realized that rock’n’roll may become a welcome asset for political mediation. As one of the first truly global phenomena, thus accommodating to the doctrine of brotherhood and unity of all Yugoslav nations and nationalities, rock’n’roll was acknowledged as a medium of cultural integration of the country’s heterogeneous population. Rock acts, accordingly, found their place in the official political ceremonies and institutional frameworks of the cultural system. Yugoslav authorities thus ‘maintained control’, while avoiding the risks of underground scenes, illegal clubs and black record markets. In turn, this ‘openness’ contributed to the positive image cultivated by Yugoslavia’s foreign relations policy of indiscriminate cooperation with the East, West and ‘non-aligned world’. As a result, this rather specific situation informed two opposite retrospective views on the (political) significance of rock culture in the socialist Yugoslavia: 1) due to its full incorporation ‘into the system’ popular culture was not (and could by no means become) a viable platform for communicating social dissent; 2) Yugoslav rock’n’roll was ‘much more than just music’: it was a prime medium of reflection on the ideals of the socialist federation and ‘critic’ of the discrepancies between the officially proclaimed and real ‘matters of fa