Potential Impact of Reactor Core Damage on Severe Accident Management Actions in Vicinity of Spent Fuel Pool

Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident showed that plant technical support center (TSC) in an extreme and rare external event (design extended condition (DEC)) can have a problem in the case of coincident loss of decay heat removal from the core (possibly resulting in significant core damage) and loss of decay heat removal from spent fuel pool. From the point of view of prioritizing severe accident management strategies it looks like the priority mitigation action should be to reestablish the emergency core cooling in the reactor pressure vessel. The reason is the longer time window available before the water inventory in the spent fuel pool would be evaporated and spent fuel exposed to overheating. However, if such actions would not be successful and reactor core would, consequently, be damaged, potential design basis leakage (or even greater leakage) from the containment to the fuel handling building (FHB) can affect already established TSC measures or operator accessibility to FHB, or it can jeopardize functioning of the systems, structures and components due to radioactive releases and presence of hydrogen (independently of the fact that containment atmosphere can be inerted by steam or that containment may be equipped with passive autolytic recombiners (PARs)). Paper describes an engineering evaluation of possible hydrogen presence in the containment annulus, its flammability and leakages through the penetrations toward FHB in the case of long term station blackout (SBO) without successful restoration of the core cooling in the reactor pressure vessel. SBO accident sequence progression and amount of produced hydrogen is evaluated by MAAP code