Evaluation of the Process of Pension System Privatization in Croatia

Hrvatska je 2002. godine provela radikalnu reformu mirovinskog sustava privatizacijom dijela javnog sustava, takozvani II. stup definiranih doprinosa, te uvođenjem i III. dobrovoljnog stupa. Reforma je provedena po modelu Svjetske banke slično kao i u drugim tranzicijskim zemljama. Za razliku od drugih tranzicijskih zemalja, hrvatski je sustav preživio krizu i u njemu nisu poduzimane značajnije dodatne reforme. U tekstu se tematizira korist i potreba provođenja evaluacija ovako opsežnih reformi kao razvoj politike utemeljene na dokazima. U tom kontekstu, analiziraju se mirovinske reforme u zemljama višegradske skupine (Poljska, Slovačka i Mađarska) gdje je pod utjecajem krize ukinuto obvezno članstvo u II. stupu. Glede politike mirovinskih reformi, u ovim zemljama na djelu je proces konvergencije. Rasprave o privatizaciji mirovinskog sustava sežu u prvu polovicu 1990-ih, a uvođenjem II. stupa govorilo se o razvoju tržišta kapitala, poticanju gospodarskog razvoja, novog zapošljavanja te većih mirovina. Premda je bilo političkih planova o privremenom zaustavljanju uplata u II. stup, on je preživio krizu. Suočena s manjim mirovinama iz I. i II. stupa za dobrovoljne drugostupaše od mirovina iz I. stupa vlada je dala dodatak dragovoljnim drugostupašima koji se vraćaju u I. stup. Reformom 2018. znatan dio dodatka imaju i obvezni drugostupaši. Analiza javnog diskursa govori da su glavne dnevne novine dio medijske kampanje obveznih mirovinskih fondova (OMF), zapravo društava za upravljanje mirovinskim fondovima, i u njima nema mjesta za drugačije mišljenje o II. stupu. U tekstu se analiziraju operativni troškovi društava za upravljanje OMF-ima, dominanta ulaganja u države obveznice čime se povećava javni dug te, imajući u vidu javne podatke, tranzicijski trošak. Zaključno se vrednuju dometi mirovinske reforme s nalazima evaluacije koji ukazuju na neodrživost II. stupa te njegovu reformu kao u spomenutim tranzicijskim zemljama.In 2002 Croatia implemented a radical pension system reform through privatization of a part of the public system, the so-called second pillar of defined contributions and the introduction of the third voluntary pillar. The reform was implemented according to the World Bank model, similarly as in other countries in transition. Unlike other countries in transition, the Croatian system survived the crisis and no other significant additional reform was undertaken in it. The text analyses the use and need of conducting an evaluation of such comprehensive reforms as a policy development based on evidence. In that context, the paper examines pension reforms in the Visegrád Group countries (Poland, Slovakia and Hungary) where the mandatory participation in the second pillar was cancelled due to the crisis. With regard to pension reform policies, these countries are undergoing a convergence process. Discussions about the pension system privatization date back to the first part of the 1990s, and the introduction of the mandatory second pillar opened debates about the capital market development, stimulation of economic growth, new employment and larger pensions. Although there were some political plans to temporarily halt payments to the second pillar, it survived the crisis. Faced with the pensions from the first and second pillars for voluntary second tier participants that were smaller than the pensions from the first pillar only, the government gave an increase to the second tier participants returning to the first pillar. The 2018 reform provided a considerable part of the increase for the mandatory second tier participants. The public discourse analysis shows that main daily newspapers serve as a part of the media campaign of the mandatory pension funds, actually pension fund management companies, and there is no place for different opinions about the second pillar in them. The paper analyses the operative costs of pension fund management companies, dominant investments in government bonds which increases public debt and, bearing in mind publicly available data, the costs of transition. Finally, pension reform aims are assessed against evaluation findings that point to the unsustainable second pillar and its reform similar to the reforms in aforementioned countries