BOŽIDAR MAGOVAC AND THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT, 1943–1944

Na temelju izvorne građe autor prikazuje sudbinu B. Magovca, disidenta HSS-a i vođe haesesovaca-partizana te osnivača Izvršnog odbora Hrvatske seljačke stranke, kojeg su komunisti izbacili iz partizanskog pokreta kao opasnog suparnika zbog njegovog dosljednog inzistiranja na očuvanju autonomije HSS-a i borbi za ravnopravne odnose s Komunističkom partijom, od dolaska u partizane 1943. do njegovog smjenjivanja sa svih dužnosti i internacije u kolovozu 1944.In 1943 Božidar Magovac rejected his party\u27s (the Croatian Peasant Party, Hrvatska Seljačka Stranka, or HSS) twin policies of \u27wait and see\u27 and of maintaining an equal distance from the ustaša (radical nationalist) and partisan (Communist) movements. He opted for cooperation with the Communist party (KPJ) and participation in the partisan movement. He became one of the most important individuals in the HSS during 1943 and 1944, but incurred opposition from the party\u27s leadership. Pressured by the British policy of support for opposition parties, in 1944 some leaders of the HSS adopted a more aggressive orientation and entered into discussions with the KPJ and leaders of the partisan movement. Magovac\u27s political ideas thus came to prominence, but not Magovac himself, who had been rejected by the KPJ in the meantime. The communists, however, were forced to reconsider their tactics. They lacked other sufficiently well-known HSS leaders from the ranks of the opposition who could be used to sway the Croat masses to the partisan movement. They believed that in Magovac they had a man who was prominent enough to break the back of the HSS and displace the president Dr. Vladko Maček, who posed a serious threat to their goals. The KPJ wanted to be able to easily manipulate the HSS in the struggle for power that would ensue after the collapse of the NDH (Indepent State of Croatia) and liberation from the Germans. Unlike the KPJ, Magovac accepted the position adopted by the Popular Front and came out in favour of the equality of all members of the opposition movement. When he became an obstacle to their plans, the communists, with the assistance of the pro-communist elements in the internal committee of the HSS, removed him from all offices and placed him under house arrest to the end of the war. The British believed, with Šubašić firmly under their influence and the Šubašić-Tito agreement wrapped up, that they had secured the interests of the Yugoslav Monarchy and prevented the communists from monopolizing power. Thus, they were not inclined to squabble over the fate of Magovac, nor soon thereafter, over Košutić either. In the larger geo-political power game, Magovac and Košutić were small players. To the British, they were not equal to the potential risk of an open conflict with the KPJ and Yugoslavia, supported by the USSR