Heidegger\u27s Critique of Descartes\u27 Cogito

Cilj je rada ukazati na mijenu u Heideggerovome mišljenju cogita. U svojim ranim radovima Heidegger iznosi stav da Descartes nikad nije smjerao k razotkrivanju cogita, već mu je cilj bio kroz sumnju doseći cogito kao apsolutno te njime uspostaviti osnovu opravdavanja i izgrađivanja ostalih znanosti. Cogito je samo nesumnjivi temelj, apsolutno jednostavno izvjesno koje je ishodište svake dedukcije. U zrelim radovima Heidegger cogito određuje kao bitan temelj novovjekovlja. U cogitu je sažeta novovjekovna težnja za slobodom samoodređenja. Čovjek kao jedino biće koje ima moć odrediti ono što je za njega nužno i ustrojavajuće postavlja sebe kao središte bića. Postaje središtem kada se svaka datost bića izjednači s predstavljenošću. Čovjek je subjectum, predstavljajuće Ja koje u svome pred-stavljanju utemeljuje svako biće u njegovome bitku i istini. Cogito kao takvo Ja predstavljajuće je koje zna da je supredstavljeno sa svojim pred-stavljanjem.The aim of the paper is to point out the shift in Heidegger\u27s view of the cogito. In his early works he felt that Descartes did not tend toward an explanation of the cogito, rather that his aim was to reach, by means of doubt, the cogito as an absolute and with it to establish a new basis for the justification and development of other fields of study. Cogito is merely the indubitable basis, an absolute simple certainty which is the starting point of all deduction. In his mature works he established the cogito as the essential basis of modernism. The aspiration of modernism to freedom of self-deterination is condensed in the cogito. Man, as the only being having the power to determine what is necessary and organizable, defined himself as the centre of being. He becomes the centre when all givens of the being are equated with their representedness. Man is the subjectum, the representing »I« that, in representing itself, establishes each being in its essence and truth. The cogito, in being such an »I«, is re-presentative knowing that it is co-represented with its act of re-presentation