MAY PARTICULAR PROVISIONS OF EU LAW ON EQUAL TREATMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS AND PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS BE INFERRED FROM A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF LAW? – CASE AUDIOLUX

U radu je prikazana presuda Europskog suda ECJ C-101/08 Audiolux, gdje je Sud, povodom zahtjeva za prethodno tumačenje, trebao odrediti postoji li u pravu EU opće načelo koje pruža zaštitu manjinskim dioničarima, tako što nameće obvezu većinskom da pri stjecanju nadzora nad društvom ponudi otkup preostalih dionica po cijeni po kojoj je stekao dionice koje su mu omogućile nadzor nad društvom. Sud je ustanovio kako opće načelo opisanog sadržaja ne postoji. Analizirajući odluku Suda, koju meritorno smatra ispravnom, autorica upozorava na opasnost od zadiranja Suda u zakonodavnu sferu. Naime, Europski sud nije ovlašten utvrđivati nova opća pravna načela, već samo može potvrditi kako u pravu EU već postoji određeno opće načelo u nepisanom obliku. Stoga, ukoliko bi Sud ustanovio da određeno načelo postoji, iako ustvari ne postoji, konstituirao bi novu normu te na sebe preuzeo zakonodavne ovlasti. Autorica smatra da bi mogućnost zadiranja Suda u zakonodavnu sferu bila bitno smanjena kada bi se diskrecijsko odlučivanje Suda od slučaja do slučaja, zamijenilo objektivno zadanim i unaprijed poznatim uvjetima koje bi Sud morao ispitivati pri svakom odlučivanju o tome postoji li u pravu EU određeno opće načelo ili ne.This paper analyses the judgement of the European Court of Justice (hereinafter: the ECJ) in the case Audiolux C-101/08. In the preliminary ruling procedure the ECJ had to decide whether EU law includes any general principle of law from which certain provisions of secondary EU law on equal treatment of shareholders and protection of minority shareholders (such as the mandatory bid rule) can be inferred. The ECJ ruled that EU law does not include any such general principle. The author does not dispute the validity of the Court’s decision as to its merits, but outlines the threat inherent in the Court’s efforts to determine a general principle of EU law. In such a scenario the Court may infringe legislative powers which are conferred to the EU Parliament and the Council by the Treaty on European Union. In this regard, it should be noted that the ECJ is not entitled to establish any new general principle of law. Instead, it may only establish that there are already certain unwritten principles in EU law. Consequently, should the ECJ create an unwritten rule where there is none, it would generate a new legal norm and thereby confer upon itself legislative powers. This would unevitably breach the „institutional balance rule” implied under the Treaty. Therefore, the author argues that the risk of this occurring will be reduced if the discretionary ruling on a case-by-case basis would be replaced by the ruling in accordance with predefined rules. The ECJ would thus have to examine in each case whether a general principle of law already exists in EU law or not