Man in Possession of Metaphysics. Elementary Settings for Heidegger\u27s Criticism of Ontotheology

Namjera ovog članka jest ukratko prikazati elementarne postavke Heideggerove kritike metafizike kao ontoteologije i prikazano iskušati u prostoru demitološkog pristupa problemu. Uvođenjem ontološke razlike kao metodološke smjernice, Heidegger je nastojao osujetiti metafizičku interferenciju bitka i bića, naime da se bitak u takvom jednom okružju uvijek iznova iskazuje kao biće. No, sama ta razlika kao nihilistički rezultat svoje vrste koliko god filozofijski opravdana, čini se, još uvijek olako podcjenjuje snagu filozofsko-teološke formule \u27έν κaΐ πlν, pogotovo u slučajevima kada u njoj postaje razvidno pitanje identičnosti bitka i sudbine. Koliko god Heideggerovo (ali i svako drugo) filozofsko mišljenje ovo pitanje uspijeva plodonosno obesnažiti, ono ni danas nimalo nije izgubilo na svom egzistencijalnom značenju, a utoliko se predležeće razmatranje na njega motivacijski posebice usredotočuje.The intention of this article is to briefly present the elementary settings for Heidegger\u27s criticism of metaphysics as ontotheology and with that to challenge it with a demitological approach to the problem. By introducing ontological difference as methodological directive, Heidegger endeavours to thwart metaphysical interference between the being and entity in that, in that context the being is always expressed as the entity. However, that difference itself as a nihilistic result of its kind no matter how philosophically justified seems to still undermine the power of the philosophical-theological formula of \u27έν κaΐ πlν, particularly in cases with the question of the identity of being and destiny. No matter how Heidegger\u27s (or anyone else\u27s) philosophical thought manages to successfully invalidate this question it nevertheless to this day has not lost its existential meaning and its presenting part and consideration of it is particularly motivationally concentrated