DECISIONIST MODELS OF POLITICS

Decizionizam s pravom ističe odlučujuću važnost odluke u političkom procesu. No mora se kritički vrednovati njegova dramatska pretenzija (od Schmitta do Agambena) prema kojoj se normalnosti života suprotstavlja patos izvanrednog stanja i krize, čime se briše svaka razlika ne samo između normalnosti i izvanrednoga stanja nego čak i između demokracije i diktature. Pravi obzor s kojega se mogu objasniti decizionizam i njegovi dramatizirajući oblici jest novovjekovlje u cjelini. Rađanje decizionizma iz krize tradicije i zajedničkosti može se promatrati već na početku novovjekovlja: u Machiavellija i Hobbesa. Vrhunac dramatizacije nalazimo u Schmittovu decizionizmu, u korištenju političke teologije za dramatizaciju politike kao drame subjekta koji svoju samovoljnu slobodu dobiva sekularističkim razvlaštenjem Boga. Drugi pravac političke filozofije zagovara, nasuprot primatu decizije, politički primat diskusije i diskursa. Autora zanimaju oblici diskursa koji habermasovski ili rawlsovski kruže oko pojma deliberativne demokracije. Teorije deliberativne demokracije većinom su obilježene ovim postulatima: zahtjevom za jednakošću i uključenošću, za besprisilnošću i komunikativnošću orijentiranom na sporazumijevanje. Autor upozorava da se u tim zahtjevima iskazuju pretjerana očekivanja, koja diskurs i diskusija nisu u stanju postići (očekivanja konsenzusa i racionalnosti, podcjenjivanje preddiskurzivnih pretpostavki). U završnom dijelu autor poantira da su i decizionizam i teorija diskursa djeca novovjekovnih gubitaka tradicije i zajedništva. Decizija i diskusija sliče posvađanoj braći, premda sve poduzimaju da ospore svoje srodstvo. Moguće je posredovanje opreke tako što će zavađena braća prepoznati svoje srodstvo. Ujedinjenjem su barem zaštićeni od opasnosti iracionalizma i pretjeranoga očekivanja racionalizma.It is with good reason that decisionism stresses the crucial importance of decisions in the political process. But it is necessary to evaluate critically its dramatic pretension (from Schmitt to Agamben), according to which the normality of life is juxtaposed with the pathos of the state of exception and crisis. This erases not only every distinction between normality and the state of exception, but even between democracy and dictatorship. The proper framework from which an explanation of decisionism and its dramatizing forms can be derived is the modern age as a whole. The birth of decisionism from the crisis of tradition and commonality can be observed already in the beginning of modernity: with Machiavelli and Hobbes. We find the peak of dramatisation in Schmitt’s decisionism, in the use of political theology for the dramatization of politics as drama of the subject which obtains his self-willed freedom through a secularist disempowerment of God. The other strand of political philosophy advocates the political priority of discussion and discourse, as opposed to the priority of decision. The author is interested in forms of discourse which revolve in a Habermasian or Rawlsian way around the concept of deliberative democracy. The theories of deliberative democracy are mostly characterized by the following postulates: demand for equality and inclusion, for non-coercion and communicativeness, oriented towards mutual understanding. The author points out that these demands reflect too great expectations, which cannot be fulfilled by discourse and discussion (expectations of consensus and rationality, underestimating of pre-discursive assumptions). In the final section, the author concludes that both decisionism and theory of discourse resulted from the modern-age loss of tradition and commonality. Decision and discussion could be perceived as feuding brothers, although they are doing their best to negate their kinship. A mediation of opposition is possible insofar as the feuding brothers recognize the fact that they are related. Unification at least protects them from the danger of irrationalism and excessive expectation of rationalism