LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN THE USA

Sukcesivne epizode razvoja ustavne demokracije u SAD-u, a posebno iskustvo “paradoksa sudbenog nadzora”, pokazuju nam da je Vrhovni sud SAD-a ostvarivao barem dvije različite funkcije: (1) potvrđivanje legislative (norm enforcement) i (2) stvaranje politike propitivanjem i tumačenjem Ustava i zakona u predmetima koji su dolazili pred Sud (policy making). Te i druge podjele među američkim pravnicima dokaz su da rasprave o sudskom aktivizmu ne prestaju. No i pristaše i kritičari sudskog aktivizma slažu se u tome da su suci važan dio američkog konstitucionalnog procesa od njegovih početaka. Predmet Marbury v. Madison (1803) afirmirao je instituciju sudbenog nadzora i označio postupan izlazak sudbene vlasti u područje javnog prava. To je omogućilo daljnje širenje i transformaciju sudbene vlasti. U tekstu autor povezuje sudski aktivizam i sudbeni nadzor te se priklanja stajalištu da “judicijalizirajući aspekt modernog liberalizma” zaslužuje jednaku pažnju kao i svaki drugi aspekt demokratizacije.The successive stages of development of constitutional democracy in the USA, in particular the experience of “judicial supervision paradox”, show us that the U.S. Supreme Court performed at least two different functions: (1) norm enforcement, and (2) policy-making through re-examination and interpretation of the Constitution and the laws in cases brought before the Court. Dissent among American legal experts related to this and other matters prove that debates on judicial activism are not a thing of the past. Still, both advocates and critics of judicial activism share the view that judges have been an important part of the American constitutional process since its inception. The Marbury v. Madison case (1803) affirmed the institution of judicial supervision and denoted a gradual shift of judicial power into the field of public law. Thus further expansion and transformation of judicial power was made possible. In this article, the author establishes a connection between judicial activism and judicial supervision, and adheres to the standpoint that the “judicialising aspect of modern liberalism” deserves as much attention as any other aspect of democratisation