WHY RAWLS IS NOT A KANTIAN?

Autor polazi od tvrdnje da Rawls ne može biti kantijanac, budući da se – za razliku od Kanta, suočio s pluralizmom suvremenog inovativnog društva u kojem se pojedinci ne diferenciraju samo tradicijama, već i inovacijama na egzistencijalne dobitnike i gubitnike. Rawls misli da se ta činjenica pluralizma može samo a posteriori politički regulirati, tako da je se permanentno kultivira do građanima prihvatljivoga političkog, moralnog i pravnog poretka koji legitimira nejednakosti među građanima. Pojedinci su tako povezani u političku zajednicu pravdom shvaćenom kao fairness. U ovome tipu pravde građani međusobno priznaju nejednakosti jer žive u situaciji neizvjesnosti ili neodređenosti za koju autor smatra da je condicio humana u inovativnom društvu. U takvim uvjetima, zaključuje autor, fairness je sposobnost susreta s nepoznatom nepravdom.The author’s starting point is the argument that Rawls cannot be a Kantian, because he – unlike Kant – was faced with the pluralism of the contemporary innovative society, in which individuals are not divided into the existential winners and losers solely on the basis of different traditions but also of different innovations. Rawls thinks that this fact of pluralism may only be a posteriori politically regulated in a way that it is permanently cultivated to the level of political, moral and legal order, acceptable for citizens, which gives legitimacy to the inequalities among them. Individuals are thus linked into a political community by means of justice understood as fairness. In this type of justice, citizens allow for the inequalities because they live in uncertainty or vagueness, which the author considers to be conditio humana in the innovative society. Under such circumstances, the author concludes, fairness is an ability to cope with an unfamiliar injustice