The correctness of ballot counting in electronically held elections is a cornerstone for establishing trust in the final result. Vote counting protocols in particular can be formally specified by as systems of rules, where each rule application represents the effect of a single action in the tallying process that progresses the count. We show that this way of formalising vote counting protocols is also particularly suitable for (formally) establishing properties of tallying schemes. The key notion is that of an invariant: properties that transfer from premiss to conclusion of all vote counting rules. We show that the rule-based formulation of tallying schemes allows us to give transparent formal proofs of properties of the respective scheme...
We propose a modular multi-modal specification of real-timed, end-to-end voter-verifiable voting sys...
We present an election scheme designed to allow voters to verify that their vote is accurately inclu...
In this paper we report on some recent work to formally specify and verify electronic voting protoco...
Trust in the correctness of an election outcome requires proof of the correctness of vote counting. ...
We show how modern interactive verification tools can be used to prove complex properties of vote-c...
The ability to count ballots by computers allows us to design new voting schemes that are arguably f...
We compare and contrast our experiences in specifying, implementing and verifying the monotoni...
Abstract. In this paper, we study the problem of simultaneously achieving several se-curity properti...
Single Transferable Vote (STV) is a family of preferential voting systems, different instances of wh...
We give an introduction to deductive verification methods that can be used to formally prove t...
The encryption of ballots is crucial to maintaining integrity and anonymity in electronic voting sch...
In this paper, we formalise classes of axiomatic properties for voting rules, discuss their characte...
Receipt-freeness is the property of voting protocols that a voter cannot create a receipt which prov...
We argue that electronic vote-counting software can engender broad-based public trust in elections t...
In this paper, we discuss one particular feature of Internet voting, verifiability, against the back...
We propose a modular multi-modal specification of real-timed, end-to-end voter-verifiable voting sys...
We present an election scheme designed to allow voters to verify that their vote is accurately inclu...
In this paper we report on some recent work to formally specify and verify electronic voting protoco...
Trust in the correctness of an election outcome requires proof of the correctness of vote counting. ...
We show how modern interactive verification tools can be used to prove complex properties of vote-c...
The ability to count ballots by computers allows us to design new voting schemes that are arguably f...
We compare and contrast our experiences in specifying, implementing and verifying the monotoni...
Abstract. In this paper, we study the problem of simultaneously achieving several se-curity properti...
Single Transferable Vote (STV) is a family of preferential voting systems, different instances of wh...
We give an introduction to deductive verification methods that can be used to formally prove t...
The encryption of ballots is crucial to maintaining integrity and anonymity in electronic voting sch...
In this paper, we formalise classes of axiomatic properties for voting rules, discuss their characte...
Receipt-freeness is the property of voting protocols that a voter cannot create a receipt which prov...
We argue that electronic vote-counting software can engender broad-based public trust in elections t...
In this paper, we discuss one particular feature of Internet voting, verifiability, against the back...
We propose a modular multi-modal specification of real-timed, end-to-end voter-verifiable voting sys...
We present an election scheme designed to allow voters to verify that their vote is accurately inclu...
In this paper we report on some recent work to formally specify and verify electronic voting protoco...