We show that three conditions due to Pattanaik, when satisfied by a given profile of state-dependent preferences (linear orders) on a given and fixed set of alternatives and a probability distribution with which the various states of nature occur, are individually sufficient, for the non-emptiness of the set of alternative(s) which are individually preferred to all alternatives other than itself with probability at least half. Before this, we show that since each axiom individually implies Sen-coherence, then, as a consequence of a result obtained earlier, each axiom along with asymmetry of the preferred with at probability at least half relation implies the transitivity of the relation. All the sufficient conditions discussed here are requ...
This essay considers decision-theoretic foundations for robust Bayesian statistics. We modify the ap...
Abstract: This paper discusses the problem of specifying probabilistic models for choices (strategi...
International audienceIt is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior ...
Recent work by Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu provides axiomatic characterizations ofs ome decision rules...
In his classical contribution Szpilrajn (1930) shows that any quasi-ordering (a reflexive and trans...
This paper presents an axiomatic model of probabilistic choice under risk. In this model, when it co...
As Duncan Luce and other prominent scholars have pointed out on several occasions, testing algebraic...
Preferences are not always expressible via complete linear orders: some- times it is more natural to...
We extend de Finetti’s (1974) theory of coherence to apply also to unbounded random variables. We sh...
We study preferences over lotteries which do not necessarily satisfy completeness. We provide a char...
In this work we consider preference relations that might not be total. Partial preferences may be he...
This thesis investigates the problem of extending a (complete) order over a set to its power set. We...
Quantitative probability in the subjective theory is assumed to be finitely additive and defined on ...
This paper proposes a model of individual choice that does not assume completeness of the decision m...
Luce’s Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) choice axiom states that the ratio of choice ...
This essay considers decision-theoretic foundations for robust Bayesian statistics. We modify the ap...
Abstract: This paper discusses the problem of specifying probabilistic models for choices (strategi...
International audienceIt is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior ...
Recent work by Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu provides axiomatic characterizations ofs ome decision rules...
In his classical contribution Szpilrajn (1930) shows that any quasi-ordering (a reflexive and trans...
This paper presents an axiomatic model of probabilistic choice under risk. In this model, when it co...
As Duncan Luce and other prominent scholars have pointed out on several occasions, testing algebraic...
Preferences are not always expressible via complete linear orders: some- times it is more natural to...
We extend de Finetti’s (1974) theory of coherence to apply also to unbounded random variables. We sh...
We study preferences over lotteries which do not necessarily satisfy completeness. We provide a char...
In this work we consider preference relations that might not be total. Partial preferences may be he...
This thesis investigates the problem of extending a (complete) order over a set to its power set. We...
Quantitative probability in the subjective theory is assumed to be finitely additive and defined on ...
This paper proposes a model of individual choice that does not assume completeness of the decision m...
Luce’s Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) choice axiom states that the ratio of choice ...
This essay considers decision-theoretic foundations for robust Bayesian statistics. We modify the ap...
Abstract: This paper discusses the problem of specifying probabilistic models for choices (strategi...
International audienceIt is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior ...