Carnap and Gödel, again

Difficulties and ambiguities of Carnap's conception of logic and mathematics are the main target of Gödel's analysis in his famous drafts of 'Is mathematics Syntax of Language?'. In a recent article Gregory Lavers discusses two main recent dismissive analyses of Gödel's drafts, concluding at a defense of Gödel's arguments against Carnap's position in the 1930. Lavers partially integrates in his examination an argument that I presented in a paper published in 2003. Yet, there are three important differences between my understanding of Gödel's argument and Lavers's interpretation of it. These differences concern the appreciation of a) Gödel's strategy of using, in any critical examination of his opponents, only arguments that can be accepted by them; b) Gödel's analysis of Carnap's position in the 1950s; c) Gödel's understanding of Carnap's philosophical project. The paper aims to argue that, contrary to Lavers's opinion, Gödel takes seriously the details of Carnap's original conception and does not overlook the novelty of its solutions in the 1930s and 1950s. In particular, the comparison between Gödel's arguments in the Gibbs lecture of 1951 and in version III of his draft of 'Is mathematics Syntax of Language?' shows how Gödel had in 1953-55 a careful concern with Carnap's philosophical project of LSL