Dreyfus on Heidegger\u27s critique of Husserl\u27s intentionality: A review

This paper primarily disputes Dreyfus\u27s account of Heidegger\u27s critique of Husserl\u27s theory of intentionality. Specifically, it raises objections to the three central claims of such an account; namely: (1) that Searle\u27s theory of intentional action can be used as a stand-in for Husserl\u27s; (2) that Heidegger rejects the primordiality of the intentionality of consciousness; and (3) that Heidegger distinguishes between conscious and unconscious types of intentional actions and he privileges the latter over the former. I show the first to be unwarranted owing to a lack of fundamental parallelisms between Searle\u27s and Husserl\u27s theories of intentionality. I show the second to be mistaken for failing to take into account Heidegger\u27s strategic handling of the concept of consciousness and for contradicting Heidegger\u27s concept of care as the essential meaning of Dasein\u27s being-in-the-world. Lastly, I show the third to be highly problematic for lacking in textual evidence and explanatory power