Reason, Emotion and Human Rights

The purpose of this text is to present and assess the arguments that Ernst Tugendhat uses to support two of his thesis. The first thesis states that Kant’s categorical imperative is the only possible principle among all of the non-transcendental moral principles existing. The second thesis states that, based on that principle, it is possible to provide with a solid foundation for human rights. We shall discuss that Tugendhat’s criticism to utilitarianism, which he considers, the most relevant adversary in his search for an ethical plausible principle, is not as convincing as he supposes and that the revised notion of categorical imperative which he proposes is, in the end, equivalent to an utilitarian principle, more exactly, to the principle of equal consideration of interests formulated in 1980 by Peter Singer. Though Tugendhat admits the principle is utilitarian, he denies to acknowledge the scope of such principle regarding the defence of animal rights, abortion and the liability to help. Finally, we shall study how Tugendhat deals with the topic of human rights in view of Rorty’s thought. In order to show the appeal to moral feelings, he overturns the need to find the basis for such rights. This fact, also shows that the most commendable ethical proposal is utilitarianism, which is in line with rortian thought