Counterinsurgency does not increase the legitimacy of, or support for, central governments engaged in internal conflicts. Recent research shows quantifiable degrees of government legitimacy, national identity, and population security are necessary precursors and accurate predictors of a government’s ability to outlast a civil uprising. Because the first two predictors—government legitimacy and national identity—can be measured and do not increase during a conflict, the probability of government failure in most cases can be accurately predicted when the conflict starts
David Galulas theories has strongly influenced modern counterinsurgency (COIN) theory. According to ...
The U.S. adaptation to the provoked insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq has led to a new groundbrea...
The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.248
Prepared for the International Studies Association Conference February 17-20, 2010 New Orleans, LAAc...
Counterinsurgency (COIN) continues to be a controversial subject among military leaders. Critics arg...
The notion of “counterinsurgency” (COIN) has for some years been the central concept driving militar...
For the last three decades of the twentieth century, soldiers and academics confidently p...
Since 2006, the new counterinsurgency (“COIN”) doctrine has revolutionized the way the U.S. military...
Recent US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has proven that COIN, however revised and updated to fi...
Counterinsurgency (COIN) has made a comeback during the early 21-century since the majority of weste...
The US military has made considerable progress in developing counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and d...
Shifts in the policy of the United States place renewed emphasis on countering near-peer adversaries...
Douglas Porch, military historian and academic, currently a distinguished professor of national secu...
David Galulas theories has strongly influenced modern counterinsurgency (COIN) theory. According to ...
The inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society--a previous...
David Galulas theories has strongly influenced modern counterinsurgency (COIN) theory. According to ...
The U.S. adaptation to the provoked insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq has led to a new groundbrea...
The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.248
Prepared for the International Studies Association Conference February 17-20, 2010 New Orleans, LAAc...
Counterinsurgency (COIN) continues to be a controversial subject among military leaders. Critics arg...
The notion of “counterinsurgency” (COIN) has for some years been the central concept driving militar...
For the last three decades of the twentieth century, soldiers and academics confidently p...
Since 2006, the new counterinsurgency (“COIN”) doctrine has revolutionized the way the U.S. military...
Recent US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has proven that COIN, however revised and updated to fi...
Counterinsurgency (COIN) has made a comeback during the early 21-century since the majority of weste...
The US military has made considerable progress in developing counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and d...
Shifts in the policy of the United States place renewed emphasis on countering near-peer adversaries...
Douglas Porch, military historian and academic, currently a distinguished professor of national secu...
David Galulas theories has strongly influenced modern counterinsurgency (COIN) theory. According to ...
The inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society--a previous...
David Galulas theories has strongly influenced modern counterinsurgency (COIN) theory. According to ...
The U.S. adaptation to the provoked insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq has led to a new groundbrea...
The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.248