Regulamento de Lobby: Uma tarefa pendente no Ecuador

This paper analyze the lobbying regulation as a political participation mechanism acquired and commonly used by civil society. It draws a theoretical framework that argues how transparency contributes to lobbying legitimacy. Through an analytic comparative method, it is the aim of the article to prove lack of instruments within the Ecuadorian legal system, in contrast with the Chilean, Peruvian, Argentines and Colombian law, in order to foster transparency of interest groups influence. KEYWORDS: lobby, civil society, democracy, regulation, public politics. JEL CODE: G18, L51RESUMENEste documento es un análisis de la regulación del lobbying como un mecanismo de participación política de los actores de la sociedad civil, desde las propuestas teóricas que consideran que la transparencia aporta a la legitimidad de esta actividad. En este artículo se utiliza una metodología analítica comparativa para demostrar que el ordenamiento jurídico ecuatoriano, a diferencia del chileno, peruano, argentino y colombiano, carece de instrumentos regulatorios para transparentar la influencia de los “grupos de presión” en los procesos de toma de decisiones públicas. ABSTRACTThis paper analyze the lobbying regulation as a political participation mechanism acquired and commonly used by civil society. It draws a theoretical framework that argues how transparency contributes to lobbying legitimacy. Through an analytic comparative method, it is the aim of the article to prove lack of instruments within the Ecuadorian legal system, in contrast with the Chilean, Peruvian, Argentines and Colombian law, in order to foster transparency of interest groups influence. KEYWORDS: lobby, civil society, democracy, regulation, public politics. JEL CODE / CLASIFICACIÓN JEL: G18, L5