Even if its intelligent behaviors are the product of decentralized control systems, Mather argues that the octopus has an “Umwelt,” and, thus, a mind. I argue that Umwelt does not provide a conceptual basis for understanding the octopus as having a mind. First, Umwelt does not refer only to an organism’s perceptual abilities. Second, in providing evidence for decentralized control systems that underlie intelligent behaviors, Mather makes a case against an octopus Umwelt. Instead, the octopus is more akin to a collection of systems, or Umwelten, than a single system with an Umwelt
Mather argues convincingly for the existence of minds in octopuses based largely on laboratory exper...
Despite the reputation of octopuses as intelligent animals, their cognitive abilities seem to be mos...
Mather (2019) presents a compelling case in favour of octopus mind. Surveying an impressive array of...
Even if its intelligent behaviors are the product of decentralized control systems, Mather argues th...
Mather consolidates the case for octopus mind and how it may be structured, shifting the starting po...
Mather’s target article aligns with a common tendency of granting the octopus a mind or consciousnes...
It is difficult to imagine what an animal as different from us as the octopus ‘thinks’, but we can m...
Mather (2019) provides an excellent overview of the literature on octopus perception, cognition, mem...
It is gratifying to see the thorough discussion of whether octopuses have a mind, though perhaps a m...
Mather (2019) presents convincing evidence that octopuses have minds, but in the first 85% of the ta...
Mather is convincing about octopuses having ‘a controlling mind, motivated to gather information,’ b...
Mather (2019) has brought together the current empirical research in support of the claim that o...
Scientific discussions about the ‘mind’ of an octopus are empirically vacuous and should be confined...
Mather makes a convincing case for octopus sentience based on a lot of evidence of their complex lea...
Mather’s (2019) provocative claim that octopuses have a mind hinges on the inference that their stri...
Mather argues convincingly for the existence of minds in octopuses based largely on laboratory exper...
Despite the reputation of octopuses as intelligent animals, their cognitive abilities seem to be mos...
Mather (2019) presents a compelling case in favour of octopus mind. Surveying an impressive array of...
Even if its intelligent behaviors are the product of decentralized control systems, Mather argues th...
Mather consolidates the case for octopus mind and how it may be structured, shifting the starting po...
Mather’s target article aligns with a common tendency of granting the octopus a mind or consciousnes...
It is difficult to imagine what an animal as different from us as the octopus ‘thinks’, but we can m...
Mather (2019) provides an excellent overview of the literature on octopus perception, cognition, mem...
It is gratifying to see the thorough discussion of whether octopuses have a mind, though perhaps a m...
Mather (2019) presents convincing evidence that octopuses have minds, but in the first 85% of the ta...
Mather is convincing about octopuses having ‘a controlling mind, motivated to gather information,’ b...
Mather (2019) has brought together the current empirical research in support of the claim that o...
Scientific discussions about the ‘mind’ of an octopus are empirically vacuous and should be confined...
Mather makes a convincing case for octopus sentience based on a lot of evidence of their complex lea...
Mather’s (2019) provocative claim that octopuses have a mind hinges on the inference that their stri...
Mather argues convincingly for the existence of minds in octopuses based largely on laboratory exper...
Despite the reputation of octopuses as intelligent animals, their cognitive abilities seem to be mos...
Mather (2019) presents a compelling case in favour of octopus mind. Surveying an impressive array of...