Add to ORKGIf Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the standard approach to animal ethics generates some implausible results. Philosophers need to develop alternatives to this framework to avoid them
When discussing insect welfare, the distinction is often made between nociception and pain, the firs...
Cruse H, Schilling M. No proof for subjective experience in insects. Animal Sentience. 2016;1(9): 12...
Klein & Barron\u27s review of recent insect neurobiology helps correct the impression that insect be...
If Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the stand...
I comment on the methodology used by Klein & Barron for dealing with the question of insect sentienc...
Klein & Barron’s analysis focuses on the capacity for any subjective experience at all. It does not ...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong, both scientifically and morally, to dismiss the ...
Welfare protections for vertebrates are grounded in the belief that vertebrates are sentient and cap...
Invertebrate animals are usually seen as a kind of “aliens” which do not deserve any moral considera...
The entomology literature has historically suggested insects cannot feel pain, leading to their excl...
Recent evidence suggests that at least some insect species might plausibly feel pain. These findings...
In certain situations, insects appear to lack a response to noxious stimuli that would cause pain in...
Just as intuition, fueled by hubris, led us to exclude insects from moral consideration, so intuitio...
Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is...
We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their conclusions but w...
When discussing insect welfare, the distinction is often made between nociception and pain, the firs...
Cruse H, Schilling M. No proof for subjective experience in insects. Animal Sentience. 2016;1(9): 12...
Klein & Barron\u27s review of recent insect neurobiology helps correct the impression that insect be...
If Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the stand...
I comment on the methodology used by Klein & Barron for dealing with the question of insect sentienc...
Klein & Barron’s analysis focuses on the capacity for any subjective experience at all. It does not ...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong, both scientifically and morally, to dismiss the ...
Welfare protections for vertebrates are grounded in the belief that vertebrates are sentient and cap...
Invertebrate animals are usually seen as a kind of “aliens” which do not deserve any moral considera...
The entomology literature has historically suggested insects cannot feel pain, leading to their excl...
Recent evidence suggests that at least some insect species might plausibly feel pain. These findings...
In certain situations, insects appear to lack a response to noxious stimuli that would cause pain in...
Just as intuition, fueled by hubris, led us to exclude insects from moral consideration, so intuitio...
Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is...
We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their conclusions but w...
When discussing insect welfare, the distinction is often made between nociception and pain, the firs...
Cruse H, Schilling M. No proof for subjective experience in insects. Animal Sentience. 2016;1(9): 12...
Klein & Barron\u27s review of recent insect neurobiology helps correct the impression that insect be...
