The main result of this paper is to show that the three ancient bankruptcy situations from the 2000-year-old Babylonian Talmud can be solved by using the average lexicographic value (Alexia) from cooperative game theory.Publisher's Versio
The paper is devoted to two real problems that generate a cooperative game model with a so-calledk-c...
In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and...
Abstract: This article characterizes the per capita nucleolus for bankruptcy games as a bankruptcy r...
Bankruptcy problems arise when agents hold claims against a certain(perfectly divisible) good, and t...
Bankruptcy is a problem that can happen to anybody. It occurs when the total amount of debt to be pa...
For games with a non-empty core the Alexia value is introduced, a value which averages the lexicogra...
This paper follows the interpretation of the bankruptcy problems in terms of TU games given in O'Nei...
This paper analyzes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems that generalizes the Talmud rule (T) a...
We provide a general coalitional procedure that characterizes a family of rules for bankruptcy probl...
This paper analyzes a family of solutions to bankruptcy problems that generalizes the Talmud rule (T...
While econometrics is a reasonable recent discipline, quantitative solutions to economic problem hav...
This paper provides a comparative analysis of some classical solutions to bankruptcy problems from a...
This paper analyzes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems that generalizes the so-called reverse...
We introduce a new solution for bankruptcy problems that satisfies weaker versions of the Exemption ...
Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 20...
The paper is devoted to two real problems that generate a cooperative game model with a so-calledk-c...
In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and...
Abstract: This article characterizes the per capita nucleolus for bankruptcy games as a bankruptcy r...
Bankruptcy problems arise when agents hold claims against a certain(perfectly divisible) good, and t...
Bankruptcy is a problem that can happen to anybody. It occurs when the total amount of debt to be pa...
For games with a non-empty core the Alexia value is introduced, a value which averages the lexicogra...
This paper follows the interpretation of the bankruptcy problems in terms of TU games given in O'Nei...
This paper analyzes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems that generalizes the Talmud rule (T) a...
We provide a general coalitional procedure that characterizes a family of rules for bankruptcy probl...
This paper analyzes a family of solutions to bankruptcy problems that generalizes the Talmud rule (T...
While econometrics is a reasonable recent discipline, quantitative solutions to economic problem hav...
This paper provides a comparative analysis of some classical solutions to bankruptcy problems from a...
This paper analyzes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems that generalizes the so-called reverse...
We introduce a new solution for bankruptcy problems that satisfies weaker versions of the Exemption ...
Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 20...
The paper is devoted to two real problems that generate a cooperative game model with a so-calledk-c...
In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and...
Abstract: This article characterizes the per capita nucleolus for bankruptcy games as a bankruptcy r...
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