Relational foundations for global egalitarianism and cosmopolitan inclusion

Multiple authors have argued that moral cosmopolitanism, the thesis that every human has a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern, is compatible with domestic egalitarianism. This is because they believe that from equal concern does not follow equal treatment, and it might be possible to impartially justify partial treatment. Some such attempts at justifying restricting the scope of egalitarian demands of distrib‑ utive justice to the state proceed by application of Rawls’s principle of fair‑ ness to the provision of basic goods. But such relational approaches have been criticized by institutionalists who believe there is a global basic struc‑ ture for the provision of basic goods. Institutional approaches, however, have themselves been criticized for relying on less than global institutions, such that the egalitarianism that they may justify is not truly global either. We argue that beyond institutionally provided goods there are nonetheless some goods whose provision is truly global, such that we can find a rela‑ tional foundation for global egalitarianism, from which we can argue for cosmopolitan institutionalization