Three Essays on Corporate Financial Constraints

This thesis is composed of three self-contained empirical essays in corporate finance, with the first two exploring the financial policy and credit risk implications of data breaches, and the third examining whether financing influences the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility. In the first essay, we contribute to the growing debate on cybersecurity risks and how firms can insulate themselves, at least partially, from the adverse effects of data breach risks. Specifically, we examine the effects of data breach disclosure laws and the subsequent disclosure of data breaches on the cash policies of corporations in the United States (U.S.). Exploiting a series of natural experiments regarding staggered state-level data breach disclosure laws, we find that the passage of mandatory disclosure laws leads to an increase in cash holdings. Our finding suggests that mandatory data breach disclosure laws increase the ex ante risks related to data breaches, hence, firms hold on to more cash as a precautionary motive. Further, we find firms that suffer data breaches adjust their financial policies by holding more cash as well as decreasing external finance and investment. The second essay examines the impact of data breaches on firm credit risk. Using firm-level credit ratings and credit default swap (CDS) spreads to proxy for credit risk, we find that data breaches lead to increases in firm credit risk. Firms exposed to data breaches are more likely to experience credit rating downgrades and an increase in the CDS spread of traded bonds. Also, firms who suffer data breaches report lower sales and ROA, experience an increase in financial distress, and conditional on a data breach incident, the likelihood of a future data breach increases. Lastly, these effects are magnified for firms with low-interest coverage ratios. In the third essay, using the financial deregulation of seasoned equity issuance in the U.S. as an exogenous shock to access to equity markets, I investigate the influence of financing on the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility. I show that financing dampens the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility and promotes investment and firm growth. This provides evidence that public firms even in well-developed financial markets such as the U.S., benefit from financial deregulation that removes barriers to external equity financing, shedding light on the role of financial markets in fostering growth.