Judgments in causal chains: The impact of positive and negative motives and outcomes on lay attributions

Research on attributions about several events in causal chains has focused on chains ending in negative outcomes and has not examined positive outcomes and actions (e.g., Hilton, McClure, & Sutton, 2010; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; McClure, Hilton, & Sutton, 2007). On the other hand, research on attributions for positive and negative events has examined judgments about one event in the chain and has not examined effects on other causes in the chain or made comparative judgments about physical causes that produce similar effects to actions (e.g., Alicke, 1992; Alicke, Rose, & Bloom, 2011). This thesis integrates these two lines of research. Six studies examined judgments about two consecutive events (intentional actions and physical events) in chains leading to positive as well as negative outcomes. The intentional action was the same action (e.g. a man started a fire) that differed in motive (positive or negative). The physical event had the same causal effect as the action (e.g., a lightning strike started a fire), or was a physical event (e.g., strong wind) that occurred later in the causal chain. The results replicate previous findings that when both actions and outcomes are negative, participants rate intentional actions more causal and blameworthy than physical events. However, when the intended outcomes fail to eventuate or positively motivated actions pre-empt positive outcomes, two distinct patterns emerged: A mismatch effect that explains the cause of the outcome; and a motive effect that explains judgments of culpability (measured by judgments of blame and punitiveness in these studies). Specifically, judgments of cause, responsibility, intentionality and foresight follow the same pattern that reflects the congruence between the valence of the agent‟s motive and the outcome. In contrast, judgments of culpability follow a different pattern where motive and outcome information have independent effects. Notably, it is the moral intent of actions that primarily determines judgments of culpability. The valence of the outcome plays a secondary role and amplifies ratings. These results show that the important psychological and legal concepts of intentionality, abnormality, foresight, proximity, and outcome information are core determinants in lay attributions (e.g., Hart & Honoré, 1985; Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973; Weiner, 1995). But it is valence that plays the critical role in shaping lay reasoning. Several theoretical approaches applied in previous research on causal chains are examined, for example, Alicke's (2000) culpable control model, Tetlock's (2002) social functionalist model, and Spellman's (1997) crediting causality model. Yet none of the theories are able to account for the findings for chains that include positive actions or positive outcomes. The theoretical scope of this thesis was expanded in Study 6 to include research on the folk concept of intentionality, hindsight, and actor-observer biases (Fischhoff, 1975; Kashima, McKintyre, & Clifford, 1998; Malle & Knobe, 1997; Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007). The results are interpreted in terms of Sloman, Fernbach and Ewings' (2012) causal model of intentionality.