Improving the effectiveness of the special and differential treatment of the World Trade Organization

This paper deals with the subject of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a special right that allows developing countries preferential treatment by other member countries, particularly developed countries. The paper more specifically discusses the ineffectiveness of the SDT owing to its structure and formulation, and explores the factors that have caused such ineffectiveness. It touches upon the provisions and the ways in which they are formulated and implemented, which deemed to have lead to the ineffectiveness. An observation of the way that negotiations are conducted and the underlying interests that direct those negotiations also contribute to the slow progress of introducing changes to the provisions. Furthermore, this paper analyses and identifies steps that may be taken to improve the concept, formulation, and implementation of SDT, inter alia through amendments of the provisions and conduct of negotiations. The paper also looks at several dispute cases which highlight the ineffectiveness of the existing provisions in advancing the interests of developing countries in particular and in fulfilling its purpose in general.