Add to ORKGWe consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)'s sender-optimal persuasion as well as full revelation and everything in between are obtained in MPE, as the cost vanishes
International audienceWe consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A speaker wishes...
This dissertation consists of essays on communication in game theory. The first chapter develops a m...
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a stat...
I develop a model of dynamic persuasion. A sender has a \u85xed number of pieces of hard evidence th...
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism des...
Chapter 1 reviews the literature about the bayesian persuasion. It first describes two main approach...
I describe a Bayesian persuasion problem where Receiver has a private type representing a cutoff for...
Two long-lived players play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides inf...
A sender who chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver can often influence the receiver’s subsequent ...
We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to pe...
In this paper we study a particular game where Sender chooses a signal pi whose realization is obser...
We study dynamic games in which senders with state-independent payoffs communicate to a single recei...
We study dynamic games in which senders with state-independent payoffs communicate to a single recei...
This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a mi...
International audienceWe consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A speaker wishes...
This dissertation consists of essays on communication in game theory. The first chapter develops a m...
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a stat...
I develop a model of dynamic persuasion. A sender has a \u85xed number of pieces of hard evidence th...
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism des...
Chapter 1 reviews the literature about the bayesian persuasion. It first describes two main approach...
I describe a Bayesian persuasion problem where Receiver has a private type representing a cutoff for...
Two long-lived players play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides inf...
A sender who chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver can often influence the receiver’s subsequent ...
We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to pe...
In this paper we study a particular game where Sender chooses a signal pi whose realization is obser...
We study dynamic games in which senders with state-independent payoffs communicate to a single recei...
We study dynamic games in which senders with state-independent payoffs communicate to a single recei...
This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a mi...
International audienceWe consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A speaker wishes...
This dissertation consists of essays on communication in game theory. The first chapter develops a m...