In this note we present some sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a stable matching in the Gale-Shapley marriage classical model of even size. We also state the result on the existence of exactly two stable matchings in the marriage problem of odd size with the same conditions
AbstractA stable marriage problem of size 2n is constructed which contains stable matchings. This c...
AbstractIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage mo...
In a transferable utility context, Choo and Siow (2006) introduced a competitive model of the marria...
AbstractIt is well known that every instance of the classical stable marriage problem admits at leas...
Abstract. We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the pr...
In this paper we consider instances of stable matching problems, namely the classical stable marriag...
AbstractThe theory of linear inequalities and linear programming was recently applied to study the s...
We know from Gale and Shapley (1962) that every Two-Sided Matching Game has a stable solution. It is...
AbstractWe obtain a family of algorithms that determine stable matchings for the stable marriage pro...
AbstractA stable matching is a complete matching of men and women such that no man and woman who are...
In 1962, David Gale and Lloyd Shapley proved that, for any equal number of men and women, and each m...
The Stable Marriage Problem and its many variants have been widely studied in the literature (Gusfie...
The stable marriage problem is to find a matching between men and women, considering preference list...
This paper analyses a sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium in two-sided matching with ...
Every instance of the Stable Marriage Problem involves two finite sets of equal size. We can think o...
AbstractA stable marriage problem of size 2n is constructed which contains stable matchings. This c...
AbstractIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage mo...
In a transferable utility context, Choo and Siow (2006) introduced a competitive model of the marria...
AbstractIt is well known that every instance of the classical stable marriage problem admits at leas...
Abstract. We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the pr...
In this paper we consider instances of stable matching problems, namely the classical stable marriag...
AbstractThe theory of linear inequalities and linear programming was recently applied to study the s...
We know from Gale and Shapley (1962) that every Two-Sided Matching Game has a stable solution. It is...
AbstractWe obtain a family of algorithms that determine stable matchings for the stable marriage pro...
AbstractA stable matching is a complete matching of men and women such that no man and woman who are...
In 1962, David Gale and Lloyd Shapley proved that, for any equal number of men and women, and each m...
The Stable Marriage Problem and its many variants have been widely studied in the literature (Gusfie...
The stable marriage problem is to find a matching between men and women, considering preference list...
This paper analyses a sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium in two-sided matching with ...
Every instance of the Stable Marriage Problem involves two finite sets of equal size. We can think o...
AbstractA stable marriage problem of size 2n is constructed which contains stable matchings. This c...
AbstractIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage mo...
In a transferable utility context, Choo and Siow (2006) introduced a competitive model of the marria...
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