Encroaching Visions: Italy, Yugoslavia and the Adriatic Question, 1918–1920

The Adriatic question was one of the major causes leading to Italy’s participation in World War I. The Treaty of London, signed on 26 April 1915, to set the conditions for Italian participation in the war, was an historical turning-point in Italy’s foreign policy. Leaving the Triple Alliance to join the Entente in the war against the Central empires, Italy sought the completion of its own national unity and strategic security in the Adriatic region, where the Great War involved a veritable geopolitical revolution, due to the disappearance of the Habsburg Empire and the following constitution of the ‘first’ Yugoslavia, i.e. the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). Over the last few decades, the Adriatic problem during and after World War I has been subjected to thorough historiographic studies. Attention has focused in particular on how the Adriatic question shaped Italy’s decision to enter the Great War, Italian internal debates on the emerging Yugoslav question, Italy’s occupation of former Habsburg territories in Istria and Dalmatia, the relationship between Italy and Serbia between 1914 and 1918 and, lastly, on the role of Italian political and diplomatic representatives during the preparation and development of the Peace Conference held in Paris. Concerning the Yugoslav Kingdom, analysis has mainly focused on the troubled dynamics of state unification the difficult post-war years - characterised by the Italian decision to refuse recognition of the newly formed Kingdom of SHS-and the role played by the Yugoslav delegation at the Peace Conference in Paris. Overall, historiographic attention has concentrated on the internal dynamics of both countries and the strictly diplomatic dimension of relations between Rome and Belgrade during World War I, illustrating the development of a troubled relationship which was to be solved - although not definitively - by the bilateral treaty signed in Rapallo in November 1920. The present contribution has a twofold goal. On the one hand, it examines the existing historiography and published document collections on the Adriatic question, in order to offer a reassessment of the complexity of Italy’s foreign policy between 1918 and 1920, divided as it was between the conservative liberals and nationalists who led to Italy’s entry in World War I, and who considered the Yugoslav Kingdom as a strategic threat to Italy’s hegemonic plans in South East Europe, and the democratic liberals and democratic interventionists who, instead, believed that security and hegemonic goals could be achieved through a more cooperative attitude. The latter approach was to prevail in Rapallo, although it had to face the radical and extremist attitude of the Yugoslav counterpart. On the other hand, this chapter addresses Yugoslav perceptions towards liberal Italy, Belgrade’s troubled relations with Italy’s occupation forces in Dalmatia and Istria, the way in which the Yugoslav diplomacy observed the evolution of the internal political balance of power in Rome and, at the same time, Italy’s dealings with the United States and the Entente powers. This analysis draws on primary sources from the Archives of Yugoslavia - particularly on the telegrams from the ‘Legation’ of the Kingdom of SHS in Rome and the correspondence between the Yugoslav delegation in Paris and the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade. Comparing reciprocal perceptions between Rome and Belgrade, the present chapter contextualises Italian-Yugoslav relations within the broader post-war European diplomatic framework, overcoming the traditional bilateral perspective of studies on this subject. It shows that Italy’s position in the international system after World War I was that of a regional power which was able to achieve most of its historical territorial ambitions - thereby completing the process of national unification - and, at the same time, to be regarded as a pivotal player in the balance of power in Europe. In the conclusions, this contribution highlights the need to reassess the foreign policy achievements of pre-fascist Italy - well beyond the ‘decadent’ way in which it has traditionally been escribed