LITERAL MEANING (book)

This is the first draft of a long overdue book for Cambridge University Press. Bibliographical references are missing.Contents Introduction Chapter 1: Two approaches to 'what is said' 1.1 The basic triad 1.2 Minimalism 1.3 Literal truth-conditions vs actual truth-conditions 1.4 A problem for Minimalism 1.5 The availability of what is said 1.6 The availability-based approach 1.7 'Saying' as a pragmatic notion 1.8 Availability vs Minimalism Chapter 2: Primary pragmatic processes 2.1 Enrichment, loosening, and transfer 2.2 Rejecting the Gricean picture 2.3 Accessibility 2.4 Objections and responses 2.5 Interactive processing 2.6 The role of schemata Chapter 3: Relevance-theoretic objections 3.1 One or two systems? 3.2 Personal and sub-personal inferences 3.3 Implicature or enrichment? 3.4 Mutual adjustment of explicature and implicature 3.5 Implicated premisses Chapter 4: The Syncretic View 4.1 Four levels? 4.2 Semantics and pragmatics: the standard picture 4.3 Semantic underdeterminacy 4.4 The minimal proposition as 'common denominator' 4.5 Interaction between saturation and optional pragmatic processes 4.6 Taking stock 4.7 Minimal or reflexive? Chapter 5: Nonliteral uses 5.1 Nonliteral uses as nonminimal departures from literal meaning 5.2 Nonliteral uses and secondary meaning 5.3 Nonminimal departures without secondariness 5.4 The transparency condition 5.5 Varieties of nonliteral meaning 5.6 Conclusion Chapter 6: From Literalism to Contextualism 6.1 Five positions 6.2 Indexicalism 6.3 Contextualism 6.4 Literalist responses to the contextualist challenge 6.5 Where Indexicalism and Contextualism meet Chapter 7: Indexicalism and the Binding Fallacy 7.1 Mandatory v. Optional 7.2 Two criteria 7.3 The indexicalist challenge 7.4 Is the Binding Criterion reliable? 7.5 Variadic functions 7.6 The Binding Fallacy 7.7 Conclusion: the failure of Indexicalism Chapter 8: Circumstances of evaluation 8.1 Modality 8.2 Time and tense 8.3 Situations 8.4 Saturation or enrichment? 8.5 Sub-sentential circumstances 8.6 Conclusion Chapter 9: Contextualism: How far can we go? 9.1 The modulation of sense 9.2 The semantic relevance of modulation 9.3 Four approaches 9.4 Truth-conditional unstability: from Waismann's 'open texture' to Searle's 'background' 9.5 Ostensive definitions 9.6 Meaning Eliminativism 9.7 Conclusio