Constitutional Courts and Judicial Politics

Constitutional Courts play an increasing role in contemporary politics in every part of the world. In spite of this fact, research about Courts is under-developed beyond the US case. Research on European Constitutional Courts focused on the Judicialization hypothesis and especially the effects of the abstract review procedure on legislative behaviour (Landfried 1984, Stone 1992. 1999). Only a few articles questioned this position and claimed that Judicialization may at least be regulated by some variables, such as court position or public opinion (e.g. Vanberg 1998, 2001). Main countries under investigation were France and Germany. Additionally, we rarely (Ginsburg 2003) find substantial comparative analyses of Constitutional Courts and their institutional settings even though courts play an important role in most concepts of comparative politics (e.g. Lijphart 1999, Tsebelis 2002). Thus, Scholars are divided about the precise impact of Constitutional Courts as counter-majoritarian institutions or as veto players and the variables controlling it. To understand the role of Constitutional Courts in different political systems accurately, we need to base our knowledge on an explicit comparison between Courts. In order to do so, data, methodologies and theories should be truly and rigorously comparative. The aim of this panel is to focus on data, methods and theories that will stimulate comparative studies on Constitutional Courts. We expect papers focusing on one of these aspects or using the comparative approach to investigate a substantial issue concerning either intra-court decision-making or the role of courts in political systems. Papers on Eastern European Constitutional Courts are especially welcome