On moral heroism and scientific vocation

Приводится ряд критических замечаний по поводу тезиса о моральном героизме как основании научного призвания. Автор полагает, что образ ученого, представленный в статье И.Т. Касавина «Наука как обществественное благо», скорее соответствует образу философа. Психологистский подход к концептуализации научного призвания едва ли может быть использован при понимании субъектности ученого в современ-ной большой науке. Альтернативу психологистскому подходу предлагает эпистемология добродетелей: здесь мерой соответствия научному призванию становится демонстрация эпистемических добродетелей в ответственном исследовании. The article provides a number of critical remarks on the thesis of moral heroism as the basis of scientific vocation. The author believes that the image of the scientist presented in the article “Science: A Public Good and a Humanistic Project” by Ilya Kasavin rather corresponds to the image of a philosopher. The author believes that the psychological approach to the conceptualization of scientific vocation is not promising for understanding scientist’s agency in the modern big science. The goal-setting of individual researchers can easily be changed, and the boundary striving for truth may not be a motivational determinant at all, giving way to curiosity and joy from communicating with like-minded people. The author claims that moral heroism as a criterion of scientific vocation suggests that scientists should be divided into the selected “knights of truth”, whose names remain in history, and the impersonal majority, busy with routine work and technical support of research. It looks like, in accordance with the discussed approach, the latter, since they do not fit the image of a moral hero, do not have scientific vocation at all. The author considers the problem of the definition of a scientist and attribution of authorship in scientific collaborations. In addition, the author notes that the image of a scientist as a moral hero harms the interests of expert examination and the establishment of peer participation of all interested parties in it. The author believes that an alternative to the psychological approach is offered by virtue epistemology: here, the demonstration of epistemic virtues in responsible inquiry becomes a measure of compliance with scientific vocation