En teorikonsumerande fallstudie om luftoperationerna i Libyenkriget genom Warden och Pape

In 2011, a coalition of member states in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization together with partner nations outside of the alliance cooperated against the Libyan regime led by Colonel Muammar Khadaffi. The primary goals of the operations in Libya were to protect the civil population from attacks by the Libyan regime, maintain the no-flyzone and arms embargo. The operations in Libya proved to be successful and many authors claims that airpower were the main key to the victory.John A. Warden III and Robert A. Pape have been mentioned in discussions about airpower and there have also been a debate regarding which theory that best describes how air power should be used. Some authors who have examined the Libyan war claims that the outcome can be understood with John Wardens theories while other claims that it can be understood from Robert Papes theories.This study aims to examine and try to understand the outcome of the air campaign in Libya 2011. Based on the accomplishment of air power in the Libyan civil war along with the debate between John Warden and Robert Pape the conclusion of this study is that the success in the war can be identified in both theories. John Warden’s theory about strategic airpower together with Robert Pape’s theory about direct support of ground forces seems to be the key factor that ended the war with a successful outcome