Corrupción y confianza en México: el caso de las palancas

What happens when a country does not endorse its government with an elementary level of confidence? One possible answer is that the society of such a country is perfectly capable of assembling other more particular logics of trust: one that is based not on universal formal values but on particular specific relationships among families, friendship or networks of acquaintances. As Putnam (2016) has explained about social capital, trust can also build social interrelations through contradictory logics. Contradictory with formal rules or procedures, but nevertheless effective and functional at societal day to day level. Indeed, multiple examples of practices based on trust such as the so-called «exchange of favors» have been studied in diverse societies (Ledeneva 2018). In Mexico there is such a widespread practice: it is called «levers». And in the Mexican case, as in many other countries in Latin America, levers are useful to circumvent, above all, formal rules that come from government regulations and laws. Levers, as a particularistic logic of trust, is a rich relationship and can be become sophisticated in its dynamics: it requires rules of engagement, communicational skills, rules of etiquette, and even its sustained throughout its own codes of ethics. The (vicious?) cycle is clear: these particularistic practices flourish because the government is not trusted to act impartially and effectively. Through the levers case study, this article studies the logic of reproduction of particularistic forms of trust, linking Mexican levers with their possible role in the widespread corruption suffered in the country. This link suggests that, if the levers require trust, corruption in the country is often based on some logic of trust as well. The socially dense phenomenon of the lever may be an interesting helpful explanatory element for the persistence of corruption in Mexico