Leniency programmes and private enforcement of cartel law

Leniency programmes and private enforcement of cartel law The available data suggests that there is an indisputable correlation between the declining attractivity of the leniency programme of the European Commission on the one hand, and the recent boom of private enforcement of cartel law on the other. It seems that in the past few years companies have become demotivated to submit leniency applications, which leads to a lower level of cartel detection and ultimately results in the weakening of both the public and private pillars of cartel law enforcement. This thesis focuses on areas that have not yet been sufficiently clarified by legislation and case-law and that are - when it comes to follow-on proceedings dealing with damages claims, held before national courts - associated with substantial risks for potential leniency applicants: (i) establishing of jurisdiction of national courts in the proceedings on claims for damages caused by anticompetitive conduct, (ii) protection of confidential information within the framework of hybrid settlements with the European Commission and in the proceedings before national courts, (iii) interpretation and application of presumptions of the existence and amount of harm caused by anticompetitive conduct and (iv) determination of the amount of harm caused by..