Subversive narratives and dangerous fictions: The securitisation of (dis)information in strategic discourses

'Disinformation', false information disseminated with the intent to mislead or cause harm, is a difficult topic to study. To be used properly as an analytical category it is necessary to prove both falsity and intent - akin to proving a lie. Like its close counterpart "fake news", it is also normatively charged and tends to be reduced to a label for inconvenient information. I argue that these normative and epistemological issues are not sufficiently dealt with in existing studies of disinformation. Furthermore, these studies make implicit positivist ontological assumptions about the objectivity of the information threat and hence fail to engage with the choices of how to specifically construct disinformation as a threat. By applying Copenhagen School Securitisation Theory to disinformation, this study joins a nascent literature applying similar constructivist frameworks to the issue. The objective of this dissertation is to explain the securitisation of disinformation (and information more broadly) within the strategic documents of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Russian Federation. This study aims to uncover the overarching themes and ideas that shape the manner in which NATO and Russia securitise the issue of disinformation. How similar (or different) are these..