The unlearning of emotion

This thesis examines emotional development from the viewpoint of personal evolution of self-hood as a function of the needs that develop in the course of acquisition of personal abilities through social interaction. Emotion is viewed as a form of behaviour, and its development synonymised with that of consciousness. The view of emotions (and consciousness) as being totally learned is examined, with regard to what the least innate aspects of consciousness might need to be present for an individual to be capable of developing self-hood and 'normal' emotionalism. A simplified overview of classical philosophy is given, with specific reference to what is seen as the fundamental question by which Philosophy can be divided: is truth absolute, and if so, can it be experienced directly? A modified form of Hegelian Idealism (similar to that proposed by Marx) is used to outline the origins of the sociogenetic approach to the development of personality as characterised by the works of George Herbert Mead, and mirrored by the work of Lev Vygotsky. In the second section, the concept of the least innate aspect of self-hood ('the minimum substrate') is examined in greater depth, and the problems of reflexivity in language and thought (which is seen as arising dialectically with language) described. The impossibility of complete precision in description by natural language is discussed, and how this relates to the concept of acquiring consciousness through social interaction. Imprecision in language is seen in reference to the imprecise and 'fuzzy' nature of 'natural categories', and chaos theory is used to provide the basis for a description of the interactions of individuals and society through language. The acquisition of consciousness through experience is given, using a behaviourist approach. The third section examines the development of emotions within an individual's life-span through a modified form of the James-Lange model of emotion, where James' concept of innate reflexes is deconstructed and self-organization through negative-feedback is substituted. The minimum substrate for emotional development is put forward as identical with that for consciousness: the capacity for reflexive comparison. Successive replacement is suggested as the appropriate description for how emotions develop. The final section is an explanation of why the thesis is written as it is, and expounds the virtues of unorthodoxy for the construction of theory in psychology. It examines the value of conflict, using the division between Radical B haviourist and Radical Cognitivist approaches as an example. The thesis ends with a definition of emotion in a non-dualist framework