We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party membership by contributing money to a party, and where a member's influence on the policy taken by her party is proportional to her campaign contribution. The policy consists of informed and uninformed voters : only informed voters join parties, and the party campaign chest, the sum of its received contributions, is used to advertise and reach uninformed voters. Parties compete with each other strategically with respect to policy choice and advertising. We propose a definition of political equilibrium, in which party membership, citizen contributions, and parties' policies are simultaneously determined, for each of four financing institutions, ...
This paper develops a probabilistic voting model in which a single lobby group commits campaign cont...
This work analyzes the impact of asymmetric financial constraints on the platforms of parties, using...
In this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majo...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
We study a model of competition between two political parties with policy compromise. There is a spe...
Abstract: We study the electoral competition between two parties vying for seats in a legislature. T...
In a Downsian model of political competition we compare the equilibrium tax and redistribution level...
This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parties receive public funds depending on their vote ...
This paper presents a model of party coalition formation between policy-motivated activists and offi...
This paper presents a model of party coalition formation between policy-motivated activists and offi...
We study whether public campaign finance creates incentives for parties to adopt a moderate public s...
Abstract. This paper treats interest groups – people in their role as consumers of a public good and...
This work analyzes the impact of asymmetric financial constraints on the platforms of parties using ...
This paper develops a probabilistic voting model in which a single lobby group commits campaign cont...
This work analyzes the impact of asymmetric financial constraints on the platforms of parties, using...
In this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majo...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party me...
We study a model of competition between two political parties with policy compromise. There is a spe...
Abstract: We study the electoral competition between two parties vying for seats in a legislature. T...
In a Downsian model of political competition we compare the equilibrium tax and redistribution level...
This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parties receive public funds depending on their vote ...
This paper presents a model of party coalition formation between policy-motivated activists and offi...
This paper presents a model of party coalition formation between policy-motivated activists and offi...
We study whether public campaign finance creates incentives for parties to adopt a moderate public s...
Abstract. This paper treats interest groups – people in their role as consumers of a public good and...
This work analyzes the impact of asymmetric financial constraints on the platforms of parties using ...
This paper develops a probabilistic voting model in which a single lobby group commits campaign cont...
This work analyzes the impact of asymmetric financial constraints on the platforms of parties, using...
In this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majo...