A Problem in Platoʼs Hagiography of Socrates

The problem for Platoʼs hagiography of Socrates can be stated as a trilemma: 1) Socrates is an exemplar of virtue; 2) Virtue is a kind of knowledge; and 3) Socrates lacks the knowledge in which virtue consists. The problem is that if we accept (2) and (3), it seems we must conclude that Socrates cannot be virtuous, which plainly conflicts with (1). If we accept (1) and (2), it seems we are forced to conclude that Socrates cannot be telling the truth when he disclaims having the knowledge of virtue (3). If we accept (1) and (3), it seems we cannot accept Socratic virtue intellectualism (2). This, then, appears to be an inconsistency in Platoʼs depiction of Socrates in the so-called "early" or "Socratic" dialogues. In this paper, I seek to show that we can actually accept each of the above claims. But in order to do so, we must recognize something about each one of the claims that has not received adequate attention in the scholarly literature. Once we attend to what has gone mostly unattended, however, the three claims can be seen as fully consistent