We utilize data from sensitive soccer games in 75 countries between the years 2001 and 2013. In these games one team was in immediate danger of relegation to a lower division (Team A) and another team was not affected by the result (Team B). Using within-country variation, our difference-in-difference analysis reveals that the more corrupt the country, according to Corruption Perceptions Index, the higher is the probability that Team A would achieve the desired result in the sensitive games relative to achieving this result in other, non-sensitive games against the same team. We also find that in the later stages of the following year, the probability that Team A would lose against Team B compared to losing against a similar team (usually b...
The study analyzes the propensity to engage in and to punish corrupt behavior in a three-person sequ...
A common finding of many analytical models is the existence of multiple equilibria of corruption. Co...
Deutscher C, Frick B, Gürtler O, Prinz J. Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Em...
The exogenous impact on public expenditures and the short time frame for their execution, represente...
Objectives. This article relies on data from 20,730 matches in 30 national soccer leagues in Europet...
In this paper, we address the problem of sabotage in tournaments with heterogeneous contestants. In ...
none2siThe problem of measuring changes in corruption internationally is significantly more dauntin...
We conducted a survey about the 2014 FIFA World Cup that measured attitudes about FIFA, players, and...
When estimating the determinants of perceived corruption, economists assumed that there is full inde...
The large negative impact of corruption on all areas of individuals’ lives suggests that it is vital...
We conducted a survey about the 2014 FIFA World Cup that measured attitudes about FIFA, players, and...
In this paper, I analyze how corruption in one country may be affected by its neighbors' corruption....
In the last decade the Italian professional leagues were involved in several police investigations. ...
We reconsider the question of what determines corruption at the cross-national level, using new meth...
Corruption is hidden action which distorts allocations of resources away from competitive outcomes. ...
The study analyzes the propensity to engage in and to punish corrupt behavior in a three-person sequ...
A common finding of many analytical models is the existence of multiple equilibria of corruption. Co...
Deutscher C, Frick B, Gürtler O, Prinz J. Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Em...
The exogenous impact on public expenditures and the short time frame for their execution, represente...
Objectives. This article relies on data from 20,730 matches in 30 national soccer leagues in Europet...
In this paper, we address the problem of sabotage in tournaments with heterogeneous contestants. In ...
none2siThe problem of measuring changes in corruption internationally is significantly more dauntin...
We conducted a survey about the 2014 FIFA World Cup that measured attitudes about FIFA, players, and...
When estimating the determinants of perceived corruption, economists assumed that there is full inde...
The large negative impact of corruption on all areas of individuals’ lives suggests that it is vital...
We conducted a survey about the 2014 FIFA World Cup that measured attitudes about FIFA, players, and...
In this paper, I analyze how corruption in one country may be affected by its neighbors' corruption....
In the last decade the Italian professional leagues were involved in several police investigations. ...
We reconsider the question of what determines corruption at the cross-national level, using new meth...
Corruption is hidden action which distorts allocations of resources away from competitive outcomes. ...
The study analyzes the propensity to engage in and to punish corrupt behavior in a three-person sequ...
A common finding of many analytical models is the existence of multiple equilibria of corruption. Co...
Deutscher C, Frick B, Gürtler O, Prinz J. Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Em...