US-Syrian Relations, 1920-1967: The Bitter Harvest of a Flawed Policy

This essay explores the course of US-Syrian relations from the end of World War I until the Six Day War of 1967. It argues that despite the early understanding between the two countries the US government never managed to develop a robust foreign policy toward this country and always regarded it as part of greater strategic and ideological concerns, which occupied the minds of the policy makers in Washington at that time such as the competition with the Soviet Union over the Middle East, which loomed large in US defense policy during the Cold War and the struggle against pan-Arabism. In addition, the author attributes this failure to the deference which the US government had toward French interests in the region and to its tendency to regard Syria as a mere participant in the Arab-Israeli conflict and above all, to intervene in Syrian affairs with a deliberate intent to overthrow the regime and install pro-US leaders in Syria. The attempts to interfere in Syria began soon after the country's independence and had a negative effect of the future of the bilateral relations. In addition, the author argues that Syria's leaders tended to rely on Soviet aid and thereby put little efforts in the attempt to convince Washington to adopt a more balanced policy in the Israeli-Syrian conflict. The author shows how the flawed foundations of the bilateral relations culminated in the hostility which brought Syria to sever it relations in the aftermath of the Six Day War of 1967