We assess the effect of credit information sharing on bank stability for a sample of 161 banks located in 30 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over 2004-2014. We find that banks become more stable as the quality of credit information sharing institutions improves. Moreover, despite foreign banks having an informational disadvantage with respect to domestic banks due to distance-related information frictions, and hence the assumption that they would benefit more from credit information sharing, the results indicate that both types of banks are affected in the same way. This suggests that foreign banks rely on alternative strategies to compensate for their informational disadvantage in local markets.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishe
This paper analyzes the impact of credit information sharing on financial stability, drawing specia...
Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, it may se...
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard...
Beck, StacieFalaris, Evangelos M.I investigate how the existence of an information sharing instituti...
Paying particular attention to the degree of banking market concentration in developing countries, t...
Departing from the existing literature, which associates credit information sharing with improved ac...
The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version.The development of cred...
The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final ...
International audienceThis paper analyses the impact of credit information sharing on financial stab...
Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, it may se...
Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, it may se...
We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the...
We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the...
We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the...
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard...
This paper analyzes the impact of credit information sharing on financial stability, drawing specia...
Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, it may se...
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard...
Beck, StacieFalaris, Evangelos M.I investigate how the existence of an information sharing instituti...
Paying particular attention to the degree of banking market concentration in developing countries, t...
Departing from the existing literature, which associates credit information sharing with improved ac...
The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version.The development of cred...
The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final ...
International audienceThis paper analyses the impact of credit information sharing on financial stab...
Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, it may se...
Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, it may se...
We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the...
We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the...
We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the...
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard...
This paper analyzes the impact of credit information sharing on financial stability, drawing specia...
Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, it may se...
Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard...