Add to ORKGInternational audienceWe experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where individuals are allowed to update upwards their contribution during a fixed time interval. Experimental evidence shows that subjects increase their contributions in order to finance the cost of the good. The public good is financed more frequently when its cost is low relative to the social ability to pay
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
We explore the effect of fixed versus dynamic group membership on public good provision. In a novel ...
We experiment a new mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good: in a fixed period individ...
International audienceWe experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where in...
We experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where individuals are allowed ...
There is a lengthy economic tradition studying “public goods. ” Despite the pluralistic title, much ...
We introduce a dynamic public goods game, where an individual's investment in the public good at a g...
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their indivi...
Many public projects are funded in a dynamic manner in which contributors are able to make gradual i...
Abstract: We present an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good. The game has a domin...
This paper theoretically explores the voluntary provision of a public good in a finitely repeated se...
Previous experimental studies indicate that voluntary contributions to a public good decline over ti...
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
Recommended contributions are often observed in fundraising campaigns for charitable and other publi...
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
We explore the effect of fixed versus dynamic group membership on public good provision. In a novel ...
We experiment a new mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good: in a fixed period individ...
International audienceWe experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where in...
We experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where individuals are allowed ...
There is a lengthy economic tradition studying “public goods. ” Despite the pluralistic title, much ...
We introduce a dynamic public goods game, where an individual's investment in the public good at a g...
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their indivi...
Many public projects are funded in a dynamic manner in which contributors are able to make gradual i...
Abstract: We present an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good. The game has a domin...
This paper theoretically explores the voluntary provision of a public good in a finitely repeated se...
Previous experimental studies indicate that voluntary contributions to a public good decline over ti...
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
Recommended contributions are often observed in fundraising campaigns for charitable and other publi...
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
We explore the effect of fixed versus dynamic group membership on public good provision. In a novel ...
We experiment a new mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good: in a fixed period individ...