A phenomenology of kenosis: Jean-Luc Nancy after the theological turn

This study outlines what Jean-Luc Nancy can offer the phenomenology of religion by reading his deconstruction of Christianity in the context of the so-called ‘theological turn’ of recent phenomenology. Following Derrida’s treatment of Nancy, it intends to think ‘after’ the theological turn by achieving a deconstruction of phenomenology’s inherent theological structure which made that turn possible: starting from the theological turn phenomenology was structurally inclined to produce, this study tries to move beyond it (i.e., to ‘de-theologise’ phenomenology). The engagement with phenomenology’s turn towards theology therefore parallels Nancy’s engagement with Christianity: he draws on the theological notion of kenosis—according to which God empties himself of his divinity in the Incarnation (Philippians 2:7)—to understand Christianity as deconstructing or de-theologising itself. This study therefore frames Nancy as providing a phenomenology of kenosis: in turning to theology, phenomenology is able de-theologise itself, comes into its own as phenomenology, for the God encountered there itself consists in the self-effacement of divinity. Specifically, each half of the study critically engages the theologisation of respective aspects of Husserl’s leibhaftige Gegebenheit of phenomena: part I considers Jean-Luc Marion’s identification of givenness (Gegebenheit) with revelation, whilst part II considers Michel Henry’s identification of embodiment (Leibhaftigkeit) with incarnation. Each time, I show how Nancy provides reasons to question this identification, illustrating how philosophy and theology diverge rather than converge in matters of phenomenological analysis: i.e., givenness does not equal revelation, nor does embodiment equal incarnation. Moreover, I argue, an accurate understanding of the theological terms (revelation and incarnation) would itself indicate their divergence from the philosophical ones (givenness and embodiment). In short, only by turning to theology, can phenomenology come into its own as philosophy: by exploring the theological dimension, we can correct phenomenology’s structural theological inclination; only by passing through the theological, can phenomenology be de-theologised.